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Introduction: Echelon Defense in Action
On April 10, 2012, two Chinese law-enforcement cutters on joint patrol in the South China Sea received orders to proceed immediately to Scarborough Shoal, 
a disputed cluster of rocks 140 nautical miles west of Subic Bay, the Philippines. Earlier 
that day, a Chinese fisherman aboard one of several boats moored in the lagoon had 
transmitted an alarming message to authorities in his home port in Hainan: “Philippine 
Navy ship number 15 heading this way.”1
Ship number 15 was BRP Gregorio del Pilar, an elderly former U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) 
cutter now serving as a frigate in the Philippine navy. Not long after the first message ar-
rived in Hainan, sailors operating from the ship entered the lagoon and approached the 
Chinese boats. At this point, the fisherman sent a final message: “They’re boarding.”2
For Chinese fishermen sailing to Scarborough Shoal, the dangers to life and property 
were well-known. Despite China’s long-standing claim to the feature, the Philippines had 
administered it for decades. Since the 1990s, a number of incidents had occurred as a 
result of adventurous (and state-backed) Chinese fishermen risking personal safety for 
the precious commodities to be found in the lagoon—above all, coral and giant clams.
What had changed was China. In recent years, Chinese law-enforcement authorities—
especially an agency called China Marine Surveillance (CMS)—had increased patrols 
dramatically to disputed waters in the South China Sea, in part to protect Chinese fish-
ermen such as these. They were prepared for just such a crisis.
The two Chinese cutters, CMS 75 and CMS 84, arrived on the scene just as Philippine 
sailors prepared to arrest the suspected poachers.3 On the orders of senior officers in 
Beijing, the two ships maneuvered between Gregorio del Pilar and the entrance to the 
lagoon, physically preventing access to the Chinese fishermen. Despite their superior 
firepower, the Philippine forces did not escalate the confrontation. Doing so might have 
precipitated a military conflict, which the Philippines could not possibly win. Gregorio 
del Pilar itself would not last long in any modern clash of arms.4 And who knew? Chi-
nese naval forces might be in the area already.5
The Role of Sea Power in Chinese Maritime Dispute Strategy
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The tactical stalemate at Scarborough Shoal did not end tidily. Instead, it turned into a 
lengthy standoff that attracted worldwide attention. Both China and the Philippines kept 
vessels at the shoal, but neither side dared to use force to contest the other’s presence. 
Gregorio del Pilar was called home quickly, replaced by a less menacing Philippine coast 
guard cutter, and the Chinese fishing trawlers originally involved in the incident soon 
were allowed to leave.6 But these concessions were not enough for Beijing. China needed 
to win something.
After several weeks of fruitless diplomatic negotiation, China opted to escalate. People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) statesmen condemned the Philippine leaders for “bullying” 
their country, and issued vague threats through media mouthpieces.7 China sent more 
vessels to the scene. On May 22, Philippine authorities counted seventy-six Chinese util-
ity boats bobbing in the lagoon, with twenty trawlers also in the vicinity—this during a 
period when Chinese fishermen should have been observing an annual fishing morato-
rium.8 Moored nearby were their protectors: half a dozen Chinese coast guard cutters.9 
Meanwhile, China used other tools of statecraft, including an informal embargo on 
Philippine bananas, to punish the much weaker disputant.10
The pressure paid off. By early June, Philippine diplomats, clearly desperate for the feud 
to end, were speaking openly of de-escalation.11 On June 15, President Benigno Aquino 
III ordered the country’s ships back to port to avoid an approaching typhoon.12 Appar-
ently believing that some agreement existed with Beijing, Aquino publicly declared that 
the standoff was over.13
If any agreement existed, Beijing did not honor it. Not long after the storm cleared, Chi-
nese fishing and constabulary vessels returned to Scarborough Shoal. And now it was 
theirs. It remains so to this day.
In an interview several months after the standoff had ended, Cheng Chunfa, the head 
of CMS operations in the South China Sea, took credit for the victory at Scarborough 
Shoal on behalf of his service. Chinese forces had maintained a “dominant position” (主
导地位) throughout the two-month crisis. In doing so, they had played a pivotal role in 
restoring Chinese territory. With this triumph, they had pioneered a “new model” (新的
模式) for prosecuting the “rights-protection struggle.”14
This was not exactly true. The use of sea power to impose one’s will on another nation 
in operations short of war is far from novel. In fact, it is a very old model, often called 
“gunboat diplomacy.”15
Yet Cheng’s claim contains some truth. China indeed has developed a distinct approach 
for using sea power to assert its maritime claims, and the Scarborough Shoal incident 
was the supreme validation of that approach.16 Key components of Chinese sea power 
are integrated into what PRC strategists call an “echelon defense system” (梯次防卫体
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系).17 On the front line, China deploys coast guard forces—cutters such as CMS 75 and 
84—operating on the pretext of routine law enforcement. They directly vie for influence 
over disputed space using verbal threats backed up by nonlethal measures, but never 
armed force. To their rear, on the second line, looms the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
Navy (PLAN) surface fleet. Even if not always physically in the vicinity, its power and 
mobility exert a deterrent effect on foreign decision makers from the region, forcing 
them to compete on China’s terms.18 This coercive function also is directed at countries 
such as the United States that might intervene on behalf of competing claimants.
As the events at Scarborough Shoal suggest, China’s echelon defense approach has 
achieved remarkable successes. Since 2006, when this model began to take form, the 
geographic frontiers of PRC influence and control have expanded dramatically. Mean-
while, the influence and control of other states have undergone a corresponding contrac-
tion. Because of the resulting increase in tensions at sea, some frontline Chinese forces 
have described this campaign as a “war without gun smoke.”19
China’s success in this campaign is a function of the model’s ability to exploit two key 
asymmetries with other states.20 First, China is far more powerful than most other 
disputants, a disparity that has increased dramatically over the last decade. Coastal 
states in Southeast Asia simply do not have the fiscal and industrial resources to invest 
in the naval and coast guard tools needed to compete with China. This resource gap 
is exacerbated by the nature of the maritime arena, where a great advantage accrues to 
states that have the wherewithal to keep more forces at sea.21 Second is an asymmetry of 
resolve between China and the only other states capable of competing with it in these 
waters, Japan and the United States. Extremely cautious about how it builds and uses sea 
power, Japan has shown that it is less willing to assume the degree of risk needed to halt 
Chinese expansion than China is to pursue it. While this self-restraint may be morally 
commendable, it has failed to elicit a reciprocal response from China.22 For its part, the 
United States, which is not a direct claimant, has remained neutral in most of the mari-
time disputes, insisting only that they be handled on the basis of international law and 
without coercion or intimidation.23 Clearly, then, the outcome of this contest means less 
to the United States than it does to China, which is fighting for much more than abstract 
principles.24
China’s echelon defense approach exploits these two asymmetries while remaining 
within the constraints of Chinese grand strategy, what PRC propagandists call “peace-
ful development.” Beijing desires to leverage its growing power to alter the status quo in 
its favor. Yet it generally seeks to avoid encounters that might risk armed conflict and 
tarnish its reputation, outcomes that could undermine the stability so important to its 
economic goals. Relying on coast guard forces backed up by naval power allows China 
to pursue both objectives simultaneously. In the words of one PLA analyst, it ensures 
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“room for action” (有为空间), while at the same time ensuring a certain degree of “room 
for maneuver” (回旋余地) for Chinese diplomacy.25
This monograph examines China’s use of naval and coast guard forces to advance its 
maritime claims in the period since 2006. These include claims to sovereignty over 
dozens of land features, such as Scarborough Shoal. They also include rights to use and 
administer vast swaths of ocean that China claims on the basis of its particular interpre-
tation of international law. Chinese leaders believe that the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) entitles them to jurisdictional rights over three million 
square kilometers of maritime space, often referred to as China’s “blue national territory” 
(蓝色国土). Nearly half of this space, Chinese leaders frequently lament, is contested by 
other states. To defend these “maritime rights,” Chinese ships are charged with a whole 
host of missions that often are conducted well out of sight of land.
Part 1 outlines China’s maritime claims, the value that Chinese leaders ascribe to them, 
and the overall objectives driving PRC policy. Part 2 looks at the naval and coast guard 
forces charged with defending and advancing these claims: their organizations, doc-
trines, and capabilities. Part 3 sketches the strategic context of China’s echelon defense 
approach. Part 4 zeroes in on the six major types of operations the Chinese coast guard 
and navy conduct in disputed areas. The monograph concludes with an accounting of 
PRC expansion over the ten-year period from 2006 to 2016, including key decisions that 
guided and enabled that expansion.
Part 1: China’s Blue National Territory
China uses sea power to defend and advance its position in two major types of mari-
time disputes. The first involves claims to territory—that is, sovereignty over islands 
and other land features. China’s territorial claims are concentrated in the East and the 
South China Seas. In the East China Sea, it claims sovereignty over Diaoyu Island (钓鱼
岛) and a handful of nearby islets, which Japan, the other claimant, collectively calls the 
Senkaku Islands. Aside from a period of U.S. occupation following World War II, Japan 
has exercised administrative control over the islands since the late nineteenth century. In 
December 2008, China began taking steps to contest that control actively, in large part 
by operating coast guard forces in waters surrounding the disputed islands.
In the South China Sea, China claims sovereignty over all the land features within the 
“nine-dash line” (九段线) or “dashed line” (段续线), including the Paracel Islands 
(Xisha, 西沙), Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal (collectively called Zhongsha, 
中沙), and the Spratly Islands (Nansha, 南沙). Most of these features are tiny spits of 
sand and coral. Few, if any, of the features, and none in the Spratlys, satisfy UNCLOS 
standards for full-fledged islands entitled to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ).26 Indeed, 
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Macclesfield Bank and James Shoal (south of the Spratlys) are fully submerged at low 
tide and therefore yield no maritime entitlements whatever.
China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea bring it into disagreement with Taiwan 
(all features), the Philippines (Scarborough Shoal and the Spratlys), Brunei and Malaysia 
(some of the Spratlys), and Vietnam (all the Paracels and Spratlys).27 China currently oc-
cupies all the major Paracel features and seven of the Spratly features.28 Since mid-2012, 
it has exercised control over Scarborough Shoal, but has not moved to occupy it.
Figure 1. China’s Maritime Claims in the East and South China Seas
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The second category of maritime dispute involves “maritime rights.” This refers to the 
rights of coastal states to use and administer certain areas of the ocean, as outlined in 
international law—above all, UNCLOS. These areas, or zones, include the territorial 
sea, contiguous zone, EEZ, and, in some cases, a continental shelf. Within its twelve-
nautical-mile (nm) territorial sea, a coastal state exercises a degree of sovereignty akin 
to that exercised on land. The extent of a coastal state’s rights diminishes the farther 
away one moves from the coast. In the EEZ, for instance, the rights of a coastal state are 
strictly circumscribed. They do, however, include the exclusive right to exploit any and 
all resources that may exist in the water and seabed, which makes this zone extremely 
valuable.29
China’s many territorial disputes inevitably create disputes over maritime rights, because 
land determines the shape and extent of any resulting zones of sovereignty and jurisdic-
tion. Further complicating matters, the standards for determining maritime rights are 
themselves contested. Islands capable of human habitation, for example, generate EEZs. 
Other land features, called “rocks” and “low-tide elevations” (LTEs), generate few or no 
maritime rights.30 Conflicting positions on the legal status of different land features—
whether island, rock, or LTE—lead to disputes over maritime rights.
Disputes also can result when states separated by narrow seas (those less than four 
hundred nautical miles across) disagree on how to divide the space. China and Japan, 
for instance, still have not settled their jurisdictional boundaries in the East China Sea, 
a problem with no necessary relationship to the dispute concerning sovereignty over the 
Senkaku Islands. China claims resource and other maritime rights out to the Okinawa 
Trough, well east of the median line between it and Japan.31 In the Yellow Sea, China and 
both North and South Korea have yet to define their maritime boundaries.32
In the South China Sea, disputes over maritime rights are exacerbated by the fact that 
China has not defined its jurisdictional claims fully. To do so, it would need to draw 
baselines (i.e., starting points for maritime zones) around its claimed land features, 
indicating the status of individual features, and explain the significance of the nine-dash 
line. Perhaps seeing advantage in delay and ambiguity, it has done few of these things. 
Beijing has drawn baselines around the Paracels (in a 1996 declaration), but it has yet to 
do so for any of the Spratly features.33 Moreover, authoritative Chinese sources frequent-
ly claim Chinese jurisdiction over two million square kilometers in the South China 
Sea—roughly the area within the nine-dash line—but China has not defined the nature 
of that jurisdiction explicitly. China claims some brand of “historic rights” (历史性权益) 
in the waters bounded by the nine-dash line.34 Again, the Chinese government never has 
indicated fully what these rights entail, or specifically where they exist.35 However, key 
policies and regulations governing the activities of Chinese oil and gas companies and 
fishermen suggest that Chinese leaders assume the nine-dash line gives China expansive 
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“rights” to exploit marine resources within its limits.36 Figure 2 depicts the nine-dash 
line.37
Figure 2. China’s “Nine-Dash” Line in the South China Sea
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The statements and actions of China’s sea services shed light on the practical signifi-
cance of the nine-dash line.38 The PLA Navy operates on the assumption that China has 
“historic rights” to all the resources, both living and nonliving, within the nine-dash line, 
often referred to as China’s “traditional maritime border in the South China Sea” (南
海传统海疆线).39 This view also reflects mainstream assumptions within the Chinese 
coast guard.40 As will be discussed below, frontline rights-protection operations take 
place in all the waters within the nine-dash line.
Why China’s Maritime Claims Matter
China’s claims to sovereignty over offshore islands and to jurisdiction over water space 
are important for economic, military, and political reasons. Economically, if China 
achieved control over the three million square kilometers of waters it claims, Chinese 
firms and individuals could exploit the fish, petroleum, gas, and other resources that 
exist in and beneath those waters. Since these waters already are fished intensively, 
the economic value of biological resources in these waters is very real. The amount of 
exploitable hydrocarbon resources in the seabed of disputed areas of the East and South 
China Seas is much more theoretical. In Chinese texts, the South China Sea is depicted 
as a “second Persian Gulf.”41 It is difficult, however, to know to what extent this claim re-
flects a facts-based assessment, to what extent it is wishful thinking, and to what extent it 
is another justification for extending Chinese control over these strategically important 
waters.42 China’s endowments of terrestrial resources, always poor, are now heavily de-
pleted; this may amplify the value of offshore resources in the eyes of Chinese leaders.43
China’s maritime claims also have significant military value. China’s eastern seaboard is 
its economic heartland and home to a massively disproportionate share of the Chi-
nese population.44 Chinese analysts believe that threats to these centers of wealth have 
increased as a result of improvements in the capacity of foreign navies to project power 
ashore.45 Therefore, Chinese policy makers seek to expand “strategic space” (战略空间) 
or “strategic depth” (战略纵深) between potential adversaries and the Chinese home-
land. They hope to achieve this by increasing Chinese presence at remote distances from 
the Chinese coast and restricting or denying foreign access and maneuver within the 
so-called first island chain.46 As PLAN senior captain Xie Shiting wrote in a 2014 article, 
China seeks “to be able to detect and engage the attacking foreign forces at a distance 
as far away as possible [from the homeland].”47 Controlling island frontiers hundreds of 
miles from the mainland coast and the waters between them offers a means to alleviate 
this vulnerability.48
Moreover, by expanding peacetime presence and control over these claimed waters, 
China can improve its chances of preventing other states from threatening its vital sea 
lines of communication (SLOCs)—and, conversely, enable China to disrupt others’ 
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SLOCs—in the event of a military conflict. This is an extremely important consider-
ation, given China’s acute dependence on seaborne communications for international 
trade in raw materials and manufactured goods. Probably reflecting mainstream think-
ing in the Chinese military, two authors writing for a magazine published by the PLA 
Academy of Military Science assert that “pushing the depth of maritime defense out to 
the first island chain and normalizing military presence there is the only way for China 
to change its passive position with respect to SLOC security and ensure that China’s 
SLOC security is not subject to [the will of] another state.”49
The matter of maximizing “strategic space” in the seaward direction is of special con-
cern, given that Chinese leaders believe that China’s gravest threats are located offshore.50 
In a speech delivered in August 2013, the then director of the State Oceanic Administra-
tion (SOA), Liu Cigui, explained, “It can be predicted that for a period of time going 
forward China will face increasing challenges as it tries to safeguard its maritime rights 
and interests. The ocean will very likely be the primary direction from which China will 
face interference in the strategic period of opportunity for development and threats to 
national security.”51 In the words of two Chinese government analysts, “Today and for 
some time into the future, China’s security situation in the landward direction will be 
basically stable; security threats mostly come from the seaward direction.”52
China’s maritime claims also have significant, if intangible, political value. That others 
vie for areas that rightly belong to China is an emblem of disrespect. The need to main-
tain national dignity creates incentives for the PRC to repudiate and undermine others’ 
claims, even if the objects under dispute have very little intrinsic value.53 When the other 
disputant is a weaker state, its obstreperous actions are apt to offend Chinese leaders’ 
image of China as a great power—an image that has been fostered by Xi Jinping’s policy 
to restore national greatness (“the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”).54 In the 
case of disputes involving Japan, these emotional elements are compounded by historical 
memories of being “bullied” and occupied during the hundred years leading up to the 
founding of the PRC—the so-called Century of National Humiliation.55 Since the Chi-
nese party-state holds a monopoly on the only tools that can preserve Chinese dignity in 
the face of foreign disrespect, leaders no doubt face certain pressures to act, even when 
doing so may not be in the national interest.56
Naturally, there is much debate about the extent to which each of the above factors 
drives Chinese behavior at sea. This study does not seek to settle this debate. All three 
are certainly in play. When combined, they create a strong impetus for Chinese leaders 
to invest in and use the capabilities needed to improve China’s position in its disputes.57
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The Growing Value of Disputed Land and Sea
The value of China’s claims has increased over time, creating greater impetus to invest 
in and use tools to assert them. One can track this change in official documents, such 
as the biennial iterations of the PRC national defense white paper. The first was pub-
lished in 1998. However, it was not until the eighth iteration, released in April 2013, that 
Chinese policy makers first dedicated a section to the military’s role in safeguarding 
“maritime rights and interests.”58 This maritime focus was emphasized further in the 
most recent national defense white paper, published in 2015.59
Tracking language on maritime affairs in party congress reports reveals a similar trend. 
The Sixteenth Party Congress Report (November 2002) called for China to “engage in 
marine development.” The Seventeenth Party Congress Report (October 2007) cited the 
need to “develop the marine economy.”60 Both of these documents reflect the party-
state’s emphasis on the ocean’s importance to economic development. To these economic 
aims, the Eighteenth Party Work Report added that China must “resolutely safeguard 
national maritime rights and interests,” a pointed reference to defending and advancing 
China’s position in its disputes.61
The growing importance of China’s maritime claims also can be seen in other state docu-
ments, such as five-year plans. It was not until the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001–2005) 
that Chinese policy makers included content on the need to protect China’s “maritime 
rights and interests.” It has done so in every five-year plan since, with increasing “rights-
protection” content in each new iteration.62 The Thirteenth Five-Year Plan (2016–20), 
issued in March 2016, devotes a whole section to what might be called the civilian 
component of China’s maritime dispute strategy, openly acknowledging that China’s 
maritime rights and interests are not constant, but expanding. 
[China] will effectively safeguard territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests. 
It will strengthen the capabilities of its maritime law-enforcement agencies, deepen re-
search on maritime-related historical and legal issues, conduct overall planning for the use 
of various types of means to safeguard and expand [emphasis added] national maritime 
rights and interests, properly handle foreign infringements, and safeguard freedom of 
navigation and sea-lane security in China’s jurisdictional waters. It will actively participate 
in the establishment and protection of international and regional maritime order, improve 
mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation on maritime issues, and promote pragmatic 
cooperation on maritime issues. It will improve coordination mechanisms for maritime 
affairs, strengthen top-down design for maritime strategy, and formulate a maritime basic 
law.63 
In recent years Chinese policy makers have come to regard sovereignty over offshore is-
lands—and perhaps even maritime rights—as “core interests” (核心利益). The interna-
tional press reported the earliest inklings of this policy shift in 2010. However, Chinese 
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diplomats appear to have backtracked soon afterward.64 Other authoritative sources 
continued to use the term.65
Xi Jinping erased any ambiguity during remarks delivered at a July 2013 politburo ses-
sion devoted to discussion of policies for building China into a “maritime power” (海洋
强国), at which he declared that China would never sacrifice “core national interests.”66 
Now China’s maritime claims regularly are described as “core interests.” For example, 
at a July 2016 meeting in Beijing, then–PLAN commander Adm. Wu Shengli purport-
edly told USN Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson that China “would not 
sacrifice its sovereign rights/interests in the South China Sea. These are China’s core 
interests.”67
China maintains extensive maritime claims in the East and South China Seas, many of 
which other states contest. These include claims to sovereignty over islands and other 
land features and the right to use and administer the ocean. China’s territorial claims are 
of long standing. However, the geographic extent and content of China’s maritime rights 
claims are both ambiguous and evolving. This is especially true in the South China 
Sea, where China has yet to draw baselines around its island claims in the Spratlys or 
formally define the significance of the nine-dash line. Chinese leaders believe that the 
country’s maritime claims have significant economic, military, and political value. Over 
time, this value has grown. In consequence, the PRC leadership has felt a strong impetus 
to invest in new tools to defend and advance China’s maritime claims.
Part 2: White Hulls, Gray Hulls
To defend and advance China’s maritime claims, Chinese leaders have at their disposal an 
oceangoing fleet comprising hundreds of vessels drawn from maritime law-enforcement 
agencies and the PLA Navy.68 These ships represent a vast range of size, function, and ca-
pability. Together, they give Chinese leaders many options with which to pursue national 
objectives.
This section outlines the organizations and platforms that play the largest role in China’s 
maritime dispute strategy. It also broadly sketches the doctrinal and legal bases for their 
operations along China’s maritime frontier.69
The Coast Guard Fleet
Unlike the United States, China does not operate a single maritime law-enforcement 
agency responsible for the full range of “coast guard” missions. Rather, it funds a number 
of different agencies, each of which contributes to ensuring order and safety at sea and to 
securing national borders. In mid-2013, China began the process of integrating several 
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of these agencies into a new organization called the China Coast Guard (中国海警局) 
(CCG). The vast majority of the white-hulled ships performing sovereignty—or “rights-
protection”—operations now are painted with CCG colors and pennant numbers. 
However, this superficial sign of unity should not obscure the fact that the China Coast 
Guard does not yet exist as a single, homogeneous organization. Rather, the China Coast 
Guard should be seen as an amalgam of the four agencies brought together to create it:
 • China Marine Surveillance (中国海监)
 • China Fisheries Law Enforcement (中国渔政)
 • China Maritime Police (边防海警)
 • Antismuggling Police (缉私警察)
Because they feature prominently in the period under study, the first two of these agen-
cies merit closer attention.
China Marine Surveillance. Before being integrated into the China Coast Guard, China 
Marine Surveillance was a maritime law-enforcement agency within the State Oceanic 
Administration—itself overseen by the Ministry of Land and Resources. Nobody af-
filiated with China Marine Surveillance attempted to disguise its paramilitary identity. 
Indeed, authoritative publications have referred to China Marine Surveillance as China’s 
“second navy.”70
Tracing its roots to 1983, China Marine Surveillance was charged with performing ad-
ministrative law-enforcement (行政执法) functions—preventing illegal land reclama-
tion, mining of sea sand, discharge of pollutants, and other environmentally destructive 
activities—and defending China’s maritime claims, called “rights-protection law enforce-
ment” (维权执法).71 Small craft, motorboats, and light-displacement steel-hulled vessels 
performed the former, while the service’s oceangoing cutters primarily focused on the 
latter. The service clearly regarded rights protection as its core mission.72
China Marine Surveillance comprised both national-level units funded by the central 
government and local-level units owned and operated by coastal provinces, counties, 
and cities. National-level units were organized into detachments (支队), ten total, dis-
tributed across three regions, north, east, and south, responsible for the Bo Hai (Gulf of 
Chihli) / Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea, respectively. However, ships 
based in a given region commonly sailed beyond their jurisdictions to contribute to 
rights-protection activities in other areas, especially the South China Sea.73
While nominally part of China Marine Surveillance, local-level units operated largely on 
the basis of a different set of laws and regulations, often drafted by the local government 
that funded them. For many years, local-level units seldom had cause to leave the coun-
try’s territorial sea. But starting in 2009, the State Oceanic Administration began asking 
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local-level units—provincial-level units, in particular—to contribute to rights-protection 
operations.74 For instance, after its commissioning in 2009, the six-hundred-ton CMS 
9012, owned and operated by Shenzhen City, performed a number of rights-protection 
patrols in the South China Sea.75 All rights-protection missions were organized at the 
national level (国家的统一部署). Local-level units received compensation in the form 
of fuel and other subsidies.76
At the end of 2012, China Marine Surveillance operated twenty-eight cutters displac-
ing at least a thousand tons, by far the most of any coast guard agency. The core of the 
fleet consisted of thirteen new ships built in the 2005–12 period. These thirteen vessels 
performed the bulk of the service’s rights-protection missions.77
Fisheries Law Enforcement. Until 2013, China Fisheries Law Enforcement (FLE), an 
agency overseen by the Ministry of Agriculture, was the second major coast guard 
service active along China’s maritime frontier.78 To be sure, FLE forces had pressing fish-
eries administration functions to fulfill, most of which were inoffensive to other states. 
Indeed, in some respects the agency fostered international cooperation; for instance, its 
vessels and personnel worked with the U.S. Coast Guard to deter and defeat high-seas 
drift-net fishing in the Pacific Ocean.79
However, FLE vessels also regularly performed rights-protection missions. Indeed, Fish-
eries Law Enforcement spearheaded China’s quiet annexation of Mischief Reef in late 
1994. For years prior to the creation of the China Coast Guard, Fisheries Law Enforce-
ment regularly kept a cutter on station at the disputed Spratly feature.80 Most fisheries 
rights-protection patrols involved efforts to protect Chinese fishermen and expel foreign 
fishermen operating in Chinese-claimed waters. But FLE forces also sometimes per-
formed operations that had no plausible connection to the service’s claimed responsibili-
ties. FLE ships were involved in the harassment of USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS 23) and 
USNS Victorious (T-AGOS 19) in March 2009.81
Like China Marine Surveillance, Fisheries Law Enforcement vessels comprised both 
national- and local-level units, with the national-level forces initially performing the 
bulk of rights-protection patrols, but local-level units playing increasingly prominent 
roles over time. The 570-ton FLE 45001, a ship owned by Guangxi Autonomous Re-
gion, was the first local-level cutter to patrol the Spratlys, doing so in June 2010.82
Fisheries Law Enforcement operated far fewer large cutters than did China Marine Surveil-
lance—just a dozen displacing over a thousand tons—before it was incorporated into the 
China Coast Guard.83 All these were national-level cutters. Because of the small size of the 
national fleet, many administrative functions were performed by smaller-displacement, 
local-level ships. Again, whereas rights protection was the core responsibility of China 
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Marine Surveillance, it was only one of several major functions of Fisheries Law 
Enforcement.
Coast Guard Reform
For over a decade, Chinese commentators had called for unifying the country’s many 
maritime law-enforcement agencies into a single organization. The old model of charg-
ing each of several different agencies with a narrow set of responsibilities led to ineffi-
ciency, waste, and bureaucratic rivalry, a situation derisively called “five dragons stirring 
up the sea” (五龙闹海).84 Chinese leaders, too, were acutely aware of the need for greater 
administrative unity. However, it ultimately took an ambitious new national leader (Xi 
Jinping) and a new high-level commitment to transform China into a “maritime power” 
to prompt the PRC to begin what has been an extremely difficult and still-incomplete 
reform.85 A desire to enhance the fleet’s ability to conduct rights-protection operations 
drove the reform.86
The China Coast Guard was established officially in July 2013. Information about the 
new agency remains scarce and sometimes contradictory. Administratively it is overseen 
by the State Oceanic Administration. When conducting rights-protection operations, 
the China Coast Guard operates on behalf of—i.e., “in the name of ” (名义)—the State 
Oceanic Administration. However, these operations are subject to the “operational guid-
ance” (业务指导) of the Ministry of Public Security. What that means in practice never 
has been articulated clearly.87
The current commandant (局长) of the China Coast Guard is Meng Hongwei (孟宏伟), 
who serves concurrently as the vice-minister of the Ministry of Public Security.88 Meng’s 
administrative status is higher than that of the director of the State Oceanic Administra-
tion, a source of friction that likely has hampered reform.89 The China Coast Guard has 
two vice-commandants (副局长).90 The service also has appointed directors of func-
tional departments, analogous to USCG assistant commandants.
The China Coast Guard has three regional branches: North, East, and South. These are 
roughly equivalent to the two USCG area commands (Pacific and Atlantic). The regional 
branches oversee “contingents” (总队)—akin to USCG districts—located in each of 
China’s eleven coastal provinces and provincial-level cities. Beneath these contingents 
are the Chinese analogues of USCG district units, called “detachments” (支队).91 Of 
note, local-level CMS and FLE organizations were not included in the reorganization, 
although the China Coast Guard officially is charged with guiding their work.92 Thus, 
ships with CMS and FLE colors and pennants still patrol the maritime frontier.
At the national headquarters level, members of all four original agencies work in some 
degree of conjunction. The same appears to be true at the regional branches. However, 
CCG contingents still are not integrated fully. Indeed, CMS detachments continue to 
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exist. At the time of this writing (early 2017), the China Coast Guard still does not even 
have a common service uniform.
However, while the CCG reform is still very much a work in progress, it already is 
impacting rights-protection operations in two key ways. First, coordination among the 
different agencies has improved. Former CMS and FLE vessels now regularly deploy 
together to trouble spots, which they seldom did in the past. Moreover, rights-protection 
deployments now are overseen by a single command center in Beijing, which can and 
does communicate directly with ships at sea.93 This enables vessels from different regions 
to be directed to areas where they are needed. For instance, in 2015 eight ships based in 
the north of China were ordered to conduct rights-protection operations in the South 
China Sea, by far the service’s largest theater of operations.94
Second, former China Maritime Police (CMP) units now regularly operate in disputed 
waters.95 Before being incorporated into the China Coast Guard, the China Maritime 
Police spent most of its time performing its public security and antismuggling missions 
on or near the shore.96 A specialized force within the People’s Armed Police (PAP), it was 
considered part of China’s armed forces. Like other parts of the PAP, officers and enlisted 
personnel (官兵) had military ranks. They also had true police powers, which China 
Marine Surveillance and Fisheries Law Enforcement did not.
Former CMS and FLE vessels (and ships under contract to be built before the reform) 
continue to perform the majority of rights-protection operations. However, CMP forces 
now frequently operate with them. Identifiable by their five-digit pennant numbers, 
CMP ships are equipped with 30 mm and—on the most recent ship classes—76 mm 
deck guns. They patrol the Paracels; indeed, they played a key role in organizing the 
2014 defense of China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) Rig 981 (discussed 
in part 4).97 Former CMP vessels now conduct missions to the Senkakus, Scarborough 
Shoal, and the Spratly Islands.98 Moreover, special operations forces (特勤队员) from the 
former China Maritime Police now are assigned to at least some former CMS and FLE 
cutters.99
When the China Coast Guard was created in mid-2013, Chinese leaders did not indicate 
what kind of organization it would become: a civilian agency like China Marine Surveil-
lance, or a component of the armed forces like the China Maritime Police. The Chinese 
government still has not answered this question publicly. However, officer recruitment 
efforts begun in late 2014 suggest that Chinese leaders intend for it to become a military 
organization akin to the China Maritime Police.100
Slow progress in the reform probably has hampered efforts to improve tactical capa-
bilities. Since so many aspects of the CCG organizational identity—doctrine, chain of 
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command, training, etc.—have yet to be defined, ships and crews from different back-
grounds still do not work together as they should.101
Other Agencies
The China Coast Guard has not supplanted all of China’s other maritime agencies. The 
Ministry of Transport continues to operate two organizations with authorities and respon-
sibilities at sea: the Maritime Safety Administration and the China Rescue and Salvage 
Service. Both chiefly focus on marine safety, including by performing search and rescue, 
maintaining navigation aids, and certifying vessels and their crews.102 These two agencies 
are not on the front line and rarely engage in adversarial encounters with foreign mariners.
A few exceptions are worth citing. In July 2005, during a period of heightened tension 
with Japan, a three-thousand-ton Maritime Safety Administration cutter patrolled the 
East China Sea to show Chinese commitment to continuing operations at the Chunxiao 
gas field.103 In 2013, Maritime Safety Administration forces performed three rights-
protection patrols in the South China Sea, one of which covered 5,628 nautical miles and 
involved three cutters and a shipborne helicopter.104 Both Maritime Safety Administra-
tion and China Rescue and Salvage Service cutters helped defend CNOOC 981 during 
its deployment to disputed waters south of the Paracels in 2014.
Coast Guard Force Structure
With over 120 ships displacing more than a thousand tons, China operates by far the 
world’s largest fleet of blue-water coast guard cutters.105 Valued for their endurance, 
seaworthiness, and ability to intimidate, these large vessels perform the bulk of rights-
protection operations.106 The vast majority belong to the China Coast Guard.
As an amalgam of four formerly independent services, the China Coast Guard com-
mands a hodgepodge of vessels, including purpose-built cutters, former research vessels, 
and auxiliaries and combatants transferred from the PLA Navy. These range from 
brand-new vessels built in the great force expansion that began in 2012 to ships launched 
when Mao Zedong still ruled China. The large number of ship classes confounds efforts 
at generalization.
Until very recently, most constabulary vessels involved in rights-protection opera-
tions lacked armament. CMS ships were unarmed, save for a small number of assault 
rifles kept aboard. Some FLE cutters were equipped with deck-mounted machine guns. 
Reflecting their civilian nature, CMS and FLE cutters were called gongwuchuan (公务
船), literally, “ships for carrying out official business.” As components of China’s armed 
forces, CMP vessels were considered “warships” (舰). They had traditional deck guns, 
but did not sail to disputed waters. Many ship classes delivered since the CCG reform 
began are equipped with cannon.
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Chinese coast guard forces use a variety of nonlethal means to coerce foreign mariners. 
Most constabulary ships have powerful water cannon and sirens. For instance, CMS 
8002, a ship owned by Fujian Province, possesses water cannon that can hit targets at 
one hundred meters and sirens that can reach 153 decibels.107 At least some CMS and 
FLE ships were equipped with jamming capabilities.108
Several newer classes of ships do deserve mentioning, because they reflect an effort to 
standardize the fleet. Moreover, because of their advanced capabilities, they are likely to 
play the most prominent roles in future rights-protection operations. Displacing twelve 
thousand tons, the Zhaotou-class cutters are particularly noteworthy because they are 
easily the largest coast guard ships in the world.109 Table 1 enumerates these new classes, 
citing their USN Office of Naval Intelligence class names, ships commissioned to date, 
and other pertinent information.
Provincial-level CMS and FLE units also operate several dozen oceangoing cutters, none 
displacing more than two thousand tons. Some of these have been painted with CCG 
colors and pennant numbers; many have not. Sansha City—which nominally governs all 
Chinese-claimed space in the South China Sea—owns and operates a small fleet of mari-
time law-enforcement cutters. These vessels include the 2,600-ton former FLE 310.110
Of ce of Naval 
Intelligence Class 
Name
Displacement 
(tons)
Ships in the Class Notes
Zhaotou 12,000 2901, 3901 Armed with one 76 mm cannon. 
Owned by former CMS units.
Shuoshi II  5,800 1501, 2501, 2502, 
3501
Unarmed. Owned by former CMS 
units.
Zhaolai  4,800 1401, 2401, 3401, 
3402
Unarmed. Owned by former CMS 
units.
Shucha II  4,000 1305–1307, 2305–2308, 
3306–3308
Unarmed. Owned by former CMS 
units.
Zhaoyu  3,500 1301–1304, 2302–2304, 
3301, 35305, 3303–3305
Armed with one 30 mm cannon. 
Owned by former FLE and CMP units.
Zhaoduan  4,000 46301, 46302, 31303 
(more building)
Called 818 class. Resembles a Type 
054A frigate. Armed with one 76 
mm cannon and two 30 mm cannon. 
Owned by former CMP units.
Zhaojun  2,700 46111, 46112, 44111, 
33111, 21111 
(more building)
Called 718 class. Armed with one 76 
mm cannon. Owned by former CMP 
units.
Zhaotim  1,700 1102–1104, 3104–3106, 
21115, 31115, 33115, 
35115, 37115, 46115
Armed with one 30 mm cannon. 
Owned by former FLE and CMP 
units. Three vessels owned by current 
provincial-level FLE units.
Table 1. Major New Ship Classes of the China Coast Guard
Notes: CMP = China Maritime Police; CMS = China Marine Surveillance; FLE = Fisheries Law Enforcement.
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The Chinese coast guard has seen tremendous expansion in absolute numbers. Dur-
ing the 2009–12 period, the Chinese government made a series of decisions to invest in 
new ships. First, it empowered and supported local-level CMS and FLE organizations to 
procure new ships. In early 2010, the Chinese media revealed that provincial-level CMS 
agencies would receive national funding to build a total of thirty-six oceangoing rights-
protection cutters, all displacing between 600 and 1,500 tons. The first of these was 
delivered in early 2013. At the time of this writing, nearly all have been commissioned.111
Second, national-level CMS, FLE, and CMP units also began procuring large numbers of 
new ships. Many of these displaced over three thousand tons. The first began reaching 
the fleet in early 2014, after the CCG reform had begun. They therefore all have CCG 
colors and pennant numbers. In late 2016, the China Coast Guard began commissioning 
the first units of two new armed ship classes, the Zhaoduan and Zhaojun (see table 1). 
This could mean dozens of more ships in the coming years.
Third, at the same time that new cutters were being built from the keel up, the PLA Navy 
transferred large numbers of ships to Chinese agencies to meet immediate needs. In late 
2012, for example, China Marine Surveillance received a number of former PLAN ships, 
mostly fleet auxiliaries.112 In 2015, former CMP units under the China Coast Guard 
received three PLAN Type 053 H2G (Jiangwei I) frigates.113 Figure 3 shows the growth in 
numbers of blue-water (i.e., greater than one thousand tons) coast guard cutters.114
Figure 3. Growth in Numbers of Blue-Water CCG Cutters
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Legal Bases for Rights Protection
When operating in disputed waters, the Chinese coast guard does so on the pretext of 
routine domestic maritime law enforcement. In bridge-to-bridge communications with 
foreign mariners, Chinese coastguardsmen often invoke domestic and international law 
to justify their actions. Therefore it is useful to examine what China considers to be the 
legal bases for these operations, even while acknowledging that the regime uses the law 
as an instrument of statecraft.115
In August 2016, China’s Supreme People’s Court issued two judicial interpretations 
defining the authorities of Chinese maritime law-enforcement agencies to handle 
foreign and domestic violations taking place in China’s claimed jurisdictional waters. 
The interpretations concluded that the Chinese coast guard has the authority to arrest 
foreign mariners suspected of poaching in China’s claimed jurisdictional waters and 
charge them with violations of the criminal code. It also authorizes criminal proceedings 
against foreigners found merely entering China’s claimed territorial waters. This gives 
Chinese maritime law-enforcement officers new weapons with which to conduct rights-
protection missions. However, to date this tool has not been used.116
Rules and regulations issued at the local level also justify coast guard activities in dis-
puted areas. This is especially true in the case of Hainan, the province that nominally 
exercises jurisdiction over all two million square kilometers of Chinese-claimed waters 
in the South China Sea. Hainan’s fishing and public security regulations, both recently 
revised, have a direct bearing on disputed land and seas. The November 2012 revision 
of the province’s Regulations for the Management of Coastal Border Security and Public 
English Name Chinese Name Issued/Revised
Marine Environmental Protection 
Law of the PRC
中华人民共和国海洋环境保护法 1982, 1999
PRC Fisheries Law 中华人民共和国渔业法 1986, 2000, 2004
Law of the PRC on the Territorial 
Sea and Contiguous Zone
中华人民共和国领海及毗连区法 1992
Provisions of the PRC on Adminis-
tration of Foreign-Related Marine 
Scienti c Research
中华人民共和国涉外海洋科学研究管理规定 1996
Law of the PRC on the Exclusive 
Economic Zone and the Continen-
tal Shelf
中华人民共和国专属经济区和大陆架法 1998
Law of the PRC on the Adminis-
tration of Sea Areas
中华人民共和国海域使用管理法 2001
Law of the PRC on Island 
Protection
中华人民共和国海岛保护法 2009
Table 2. National Laws Guiding Law-Enforcement Activities in Disputed Areas
Note: PRC = People’s Republic of China.
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Order was aimed pointedly at redressing the issue of foreign vessels operating “illegally” 
in Hainan’s jurisdictional waters.117
To date, China’s coast guard reform has not been accompanied by any major revisions 
to Chinese maritime law. This could change soon. China is in the process of draft-
ing a “maritime basic law” (海洋基本法). When issued, this document should outline 
explicitly the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of China’s maritime law-enforcement 
forces and formally define their functions in China’s maritime dispute strategy.118
The Navy Surface Fleet
The PLAN surface fleet long has played an important role in defending and advancing 
China’s position in the country’s maritime disputes. Indeed, surface combatants were 
the chief protagonists in two conflicts directly involving disputed offshore islands: the 
1974 battle of the Paracels and the March 1988 clash at Johnson Reef.119 In the peacetime 
“rights-protection struggle,” the PLAN surface force is very active in both the East and 
South China Seas, even though it now often operates on the “second line.”
Operations Other Than War. The peacetime missions of the PLAN surface fleet in dis-
puted waters are considered “military operations other than war” (非战争军事行动).120 
According to the 2013 edition of the Science of Military Strategy, an authoritative volume 
published by the Academy of Military Science, the PLA Navy serves to “effectively safe-
guard sovereign rights in the maritime domain, stop infringements and illegal activities 
at sea, and ensure the normal pursuit of China’s maritime production, development, and 
scientific/research activities.” It also explicitly states that the “precondition” (前提) for 
any of these efforts is that the navy must not jeopardize “the overall stability [emphasis 
added] of the maritime situation.”121
The PLA Navy has an explicit law-enforcement function in disputed waters.122 This role 
is outlined in the 2009 Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, written by Sr. Capt. 
Ren Xiaofeng of the PLA Naval Research Institute (NRI). For instance, the Chinese navy 
is authorized to “adopt necessary measures to expel [unauthorized foreign naval vessels] 
operating in China’s territorial sea.”123 In the case of foreign civilian vessels operating in 
Chinese-claimed territorial waters in a manner inconsistent with innocent passage, the 
Chinese military should “act independently or assist Chinese maritime law-enforcement 
forces to prevent, halt, or correct and dispose of ” the offending vessel. This includes the 
use of “coercive law-enforcement measures.”124
The PLA Navy also is expected to conduct law enforcement in the EEZ. In the Hand-
book, Ren points out that the ineffectiveness of China’s maritime law-enforcement forces 
compels the navy to play a constabulary role in jurisdictional waters. Operations include 
“acting alone or assisting other maritime law-enforcement forces to prevent, halt, pun-
ish, and crack down on behavior that illegally violates Chinese sovereign rights over 
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marine resources.”125 Prescribed measures include boarding, inspections, expulsions, 
detentions, and legal proceedings.126 Ren also recommends this approach for handling 
foreign vessels conducting marine scientific activities in Chinese-claimed jurisdictional 
waters. In the case of foreign military vessels conducting “illegal” surveys in China’s EEZ, 
the PLA Navy is expected to reference instructions governing handling of foreign fishing 
vessels operating illegally in Chinese jurisdictional waters. However, the Handbook states 
that commanders must be careful to take into account the “special circumstances” inher-
ent in the fact that this is a foreign naval vessel.127
Aside from enforcing China’s maritime claims, the PLA Navy serves as an instrument by 
which to communicate Chinese intentions. It conveys Beijing’s resolve and ability to de-
fend and advance China’s interests to deter foreign states from acting in ways that harm 
those interests. This deterrent function is outlined in authoritative PLA writings going 
back decades. For example, the 1999 edition of the Science of Military Strategy (pub-
lished by China’s National Defense University) states that in the context of defending 
China’s maritime claims, the PLA Navy serves a “maritime military deterrent function.” 
By “showing” (显示) naval power, China can “put pressure on the other side, deterring 
it from daring to resort to the use of force out of fear of the difficult-to-bear and severe 
consequences that would result.”128 During international crises, China could send surface 
vessels to the contested area to “make the potential opponent not dare to act rashly [轻
举妄动], thereby helping to prevent escalation and deter war.”129
A nonscholarly volume published by the PLA Navy suggests how Chinese leaders gener-
ally see the service’s deterrent function: 
[T]he navy uses various types of channels to show its power, thereby exerting an invis-
ible pressure on the counterpart, deterring him from daring to act rashly for fear of the 
consequences, or force him to retreat for fear of consequences, thereby achieving the aim 
of “subduing the enemy without fighting,” and realizing the navy’s strategic objectives.  
. . . The navy can show its power through naval exercises, escort operations, patrols, and 
weapons testing on and beneath the sea.130 
Navy leaders are very conscious of the diplomatic impact of their actions. One PLAN 
political officer acknowledged that a Chinese surface vessel patrol through disputed wa-
ters is “not just a military operation. It is also a political operation. . . . [It] demonstrates 
the spirit of the Chinese military and its warfighting capabilities, shows our country’s 
will and resolve to safeguard maritime sovereignty, and serves our diplomacy.”131 An-
other PLAN officer described how during patrols through disputed waters the fleet must 
“actively work in concert with the overall situation of Chinese diplomacy.”132
Deterring foreign leaders from using military force is a key mission of the surface fleet. 
In this context, the fleet is seen as a tool with which to “subdue the enemy without fight-
ing” (不战而屈人之兵).133 “The enemy,” of course, means other disputants. But it also 
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means deterring any “powerful adversary” (强敌)—e.g., the United States, and perhaps 
Japan—from “interfering” (干预) or “getting involved” (介入) in China’s maritime 
disputes.134 This deterrence function is no doubt a key driver in China’s evolution from a 
“near seas” to a “far seas” naval strategy designed (in part) to enable fighting a powerful 
adversary as far away from the Chinese coast as possible.135
Force Structure and Organization. Almost all elements of the PLAN surface fleet patrol 
disputed waters. These range from tiny missile boats to twenty-thousand-ton amphibi-
ous transport docks (LPDs), and include both defenseless minesweepers and some of the 
most advanced surface combatants in the world. Each is a unique tool in the struggle at 
sea. During the last five years, the PLA Navy has built modern surface combatants at a 
rate so fast that it is often described as “dropping dumplings into boiling water” (下饺
子).136 This production rate has changed the makeup of the surface fleet dramatically.
Since 2012, the PLA Navy has built large numbers of new surface combatants, including 
destroyers (both Type 052C and 052D), frigates (054A), and corvettes (056 and 056A). 
These new ships have vastly improved combat capabilities (and therefore coercive poten-
tial) and, owing to their larger displacement, have greatly improved endurance com-
pared with the classes they replaced. The PLA Navy has evolved rapidly from a coastal 
force based on submarines and missile craft to a first-rate, blue-water navy centered on 
large surface combatants.137 This has tremendous implications for the service’s ability to 
maintain presence in disputed areas and to influence the decisions of foreign leaders.
In 2016 alone, the PLA Navy commissioned twenty-three new surface vessels. By con-
trast, the U.S. Navy commissioned just six surface ships in 2016.138
Excluding the aircraft carrier Liaoning (CV 16), which is not yet patrolling disputed 
waters, destroyers are the most capable units in the Chinese surface fleet. At the most 
advanced end, the PLA Navy operates Type 052C (Luyang II) and 052D (Luyang III) 
destroyers. These ship classes have phased-array radars and advanced missiles housed in 
vertical launching systems, and their capabilities may approach those of the U.S. Navy’s 
Arleigh Burke–class destroyers. At the time of this writing, China has commissioned six 
Type 052C destroyers and five of the follow-on Type 052D destroyers, with eight more of 
the latter in various stages of construction.139 The PLA Navy also operates four Sovremenny-
class destroyers procured from Russia to fill a gap while it developed modern destroyers 
and advanced antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) of its own.140
The PLA Navy fields some two dozen Type 054A (Jiangkai II) frigates, another modern 
surface combatant.141 In 2013, the PLA Navy began receiving a new class of ship: the 
Type 056 (Jiangdao) “light frigate,” or corvette. At only 1,300 tons, the Type 056 corvette 
appears to be purpose-built to patrol Chinese-claimed waters within the first island 
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chain. To date, the service has commissioned over thirty Type 056 hulls, with at least half 
a dozen more in various stages of construction.142
The PLA Navy also owns and operates large numbers of earlier-generation frigates, 
destroyers, corvettes, and minesweepers. Their poor war-fighting capabilities would 
render them almost valueless in a modern, high-end conflict. However, they remain use-
ful instruments of peacetime coercion, especially when directed against weaker states in 
Southeast Asia.
Amphibious warfare ships are also active in disputed areas. The most capable class in 
this category is the Type 071 LPD; four ships of the class have been commissioned to 
date. At twenty thousand tons, this ship closely resembles the USN San Antonio class. 
It contains a large well deck for landing craft (including the air-cushioned type) and a 
flight deck for embarked helicopters. But other, smaller amphibious vessels, such as tank 
landing ships (LSTs), also patrol disputed waters.143
# Type Name (hull #) Fleet Month
 1 Frigate Jingzhou (532) ESF January
 2 Minesweeper Rongcheng (811) ? January
 3 Icebreaker Haibing (722) NSF January
 4 LST Tianmushan (916) ESF January
 5 Fleet-replenishment ship Gaoyouhu (966) ESF January
 6 Corvette Jingmen (506) SSF January
 7 LPD Yimengshan (988) ESF February
 8 Survey ship Dengjiaxian (?) ESF February
 9 Corvette Tongren (507) SSF February
10 Frigate Xiangtan (531) ESF February
11 LST Wuyishan (914) ESF March
12 LST Culaishan (915) ESF March
13 LST Wutaishan (917) ESF March
14 Icebreaker Haibing (723) NSF March
15 Corvette Qujing (508) SSF June
16 Destroyer Yinchuan (175) SSF July
17 Fleet-replenishment ship Honghu (963) SSF July
18 Fleet-replenishment ship Luomahu (963) SSF July
19 Corvette Huai’an (509) ESF August
20 Corvette Baoding (511) ESF December
21 Corvette Heze (512) ESF December
22 Minesweeper Donggang (814) ? December
23 Frigate Binzhou (515) ESF December
Table 3. PLAN Surface Ships Commissioned in 2016
Notes: ESF = East Sea Fleet; LPD = amphibious transport dock; LST = tank landing ship; NSF = North Sea Fleet; SSF = South Sea Fleet.
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PLAN auxiliary vessels are active along China’s maritime frontier. These ships, most of 
which lack combat power, conduct presence missions in conjunction with other pur-
poses. For instance, the auxiliary water tanker Beishui 572 has performed at least seven 
rights-protection patrols to the Spratlys, probably as part of a supply mission to Mischief 
Reef.144
The PLAN surface fleet includes large numbers of fast-attack craft, such as the Type 022 
(Houbei) missile boat. Despite their impressive ASCM payloads, these ships are small 
and have poor endurance. Therefore, they are unable to play a direct role in the most 
remote areas along China’s maritime frontier. Indeed, these units have roots in an earlier 
age when the PLA Navy focused chiefly on coastal defense and a possible conflict in the 
Taiwan Strait. Still, Type 022 fast-attack craft can be—and have been—deployed to the 
disputed Paracel Islands to signal Chinese intentions.145
PLAN surface vessels are distributed across three regional fleets and their subordi-
nate units. The East Sea Fleet (ESF), headquartered in Ningbo (Zhejiang), is charged 
with handling disputes with Japan in the East China Sea. The South Sea Fleet (SSF), 
headquartered in Zhanjiang (Guangdong), performs the bulk of operations intended 
to uphold China’s claims in the South China Sea. Both fleets operate large numbers of 
amphibious warfare ships, destroyers, frigates, corvettes, minesweepers, auxiliaries, and 
fast-attack craft.
Prior to early 2016, peacetime surface fleet deployments were organized and com-
manded by PLAN leaders in Beijing and at regional fleet headquarters. In late 2015, the 
PLA began a major organizational reform, which has stripped the navy of significant 
authorities. Peacetime deployment decisions now are made by theater commands (战
区), the successors to the military region (军区), with the PLA Navy focusing its atten-
tion on building and training the fleet. Each theater command is responsible for security 
threats in a given “strategic direction.”146 The Eastern Theater Command, headquartered 
in Nanjing (Jiangsu), commands and coordinates PLAN surface combatant activities 
in the East China Sea. The Southern Theater Command, Guangzhou (Guangdong), is 
responsible for the fleet movements of the SSF. Its most important mission is “safeguard-
ing China’s rights and interests in the South China Sea.”147
Support Infrastructure. The capacity to provide presence in disputed waters involves 
more than ship numbers; it is also a function of the location and capacity of shore-based 
support facilities. Well-equipped bases located close to disputed areas provide easier 
access to fuel, food, water, and other necessities. This cuts down on transit times to and 
from the theater of operations, allowing ships to spend more time deployed. Since 2012, 
China has invested heavily in shore-based infrastructure for both naval and coast guard 
forces.
echelon defense 25
In the East China Sea, China has constructed new naval facilities at Nanji Island, located 
just 165 nm northwest of Uotsuri-shima in the Senkakus. These facilities include a 
seventy-to-eighty-meter pier, which already may be hosting surface combatants deploy-
ing to disputed areas in the East China Sea.148 China also has begun construction on a 
new 120-acre base for the China Coast Guard in the city of Wenzhou—much closer to 
the front line than other coast guard bases. When completed, the facility, called the Wen-
zhou Command and Comprehensive Support Base, will have six berths for coast guard 
cutters and will be able to accommodate the China Coast Guard’s new twelve-thousand-
ton Zhaotou-class cutters.149
The benefits of forward basing are especially pronounced in the South China Sea, 
given the great distances between the mainland and the areas China claims. Since early 
2014, China has invested huge sums to transform its facilities in the Spratlys from tiny 
outposts into major military complexes. With its enormous lagoon and extensive facili-
ties, the new base at Mischief Reef already is serving as a hub for Chinese surface vessels 
operating in the Spratlys. Port and berthing facilities to the southwest at Fiery Cross Reef 
place Chinese surface forces even closer to the more remote sections of the nine-dash 
line and the key shipping lanes traversing the South China Sea.150 Subi Reef hosts China’s 
third enormous basing complex in the Spratlys.
Aside from enabling increased presence in disputed waters, these new facilities provide 
other advantages. They allow for a surge of forces during a crisis. Placing significant 
combat power so close to the territory of other states also increases the credibility of 
Chinese efforts to exercise military coercion, especially to deter other states from using 
force against coast guard cutters or Chinese civilians.
Jointness
The Chinese coast guard and the PLA Navy constitute separate organizations, but they 
operate as components in an integrated echelon defense system. To maximize the effec-
tiveness of this approach, they must be able to coordinate their activities, share informa-
tion, and operate jointly in the event of a crisis. They currently do this with some degree 
of success.
This was not always the case. For many years, China lacked the ability to coordinate na-
tional strategy effectively across different agencies and the military. In 2012, China cre-
ated the Central Maritime Rights and Interests Leading Small Group (中央海洋权益工
作领导小组), a decision-making body led by Xi Jinping that was charged with formulat-
ing and coordinating maritime dispute strategy. The creation of this leading small group 
likely improved policy coordination among the groups responsible for implementing the 
PRC’s dispute strategy.151
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Prior to the coast guard reform, China Marine Surveillance maintained the closest 
interservice relationship with the PLA Navy. In part, this was a result of an institutional 
kinship that goes back decades. For years after its founding in 1964, the State Oceanic 
Administration was managed (代管) by the PLA Navy on behalf of the State Council. 
Many CMS personnel started their careers in the navy. The PLA Navy has educated 
CMS officers at military institutions such as the PLAN Command College in Nanjing, 
the Dalian Naval Academy, and the Bengbu Academy for Noncommissioned Officers.152 
PLAN units have trained CMS personnel on important skills, such as landing helicopters 
on ships at sea.153 PLAN strategists also have helped to design and assess approaches for 
using the maritime law-enforcement fleet in rights-protection operations.154
China Marine Surveillance and the PLA Navy established a mechanism for sharing 
information and coordinating activities as early as 2002. This occurred following a joint 
effort to monitor Japan’s operations to salvage an armed North Korean trawler the Japan 
Coast Guard (JCG) sank in late 2001 in (undisputed) Chinese jurisdictional waters.155 
By late 2007, China Marine Surveillance and the PLA Navy had set up “coordination 
mechanisms for maritime operations” (海上行动协调配合机制) at the regional level 
(i.e., between the three navy fleets and their corresponding CMS contingents).156 Subse-
quent years saw repeated calls for these mechanisms to be strengthened.157
Now that both the PLA and the China Coast Guard are in the process of major organi-
zational reform, interservice coordination mechanisms no doubt are in flux.158 If the past 
is any guide, coordination of peacetime ship deployments will occur largely among the 
China Coast Guard’s regional branches and the PLAN fleets or the new theater commands.
The available materials shed little light on the extent to which the Chinese navy and 
coast guard share intelligence. As mentioned above, China Marine Surveillance and the 
PLA Navy had established intelligence-sharing mechanisms as early as 2002.159 But these 
systems were probably never very satisfactory.160 While FLE vessels were not as active 
in disputed waters, they received information on foreign activities from Chinese fishing 
vessels, which operate all over the near seas and beyond.161 It is unclear how and to what 
extent Fisheries Law Enforcement shared this intelligence with the Chinese military or 
other coast guard forces.
Naval and coast guard forces ideally would share real-time information about foreign 
activities in disputed areas. However, the services evidently did not use similar or even 
compatible command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems.162 This appears to be changing. CCG ships now 
are being fitted with the HN-900 datalink systems that the PLA Navy currently uses. 
This should improve greatly the sharing of tactical information between coast guard and 
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naval forces at sea, allowing both services to contribute to and benefit from a common 
operating picture.163
During most operations, it is probably adequate that naval and coast guard forces be 
generally aware of their respective locations and missions. Crises, however, demand 
much higher standards of interoperability. To hone these skills, the PLA Navy and com-
ponents of the Chinese coast guard periodically conduct joint exercises. In September 
2014, for instance, the PLAN’s ESF and selected maritime law-enforcement forces held a 
three-day exercise in the East China Sea called Haishen-2014. The aim was to improve 
the PLA Navy’s ability to provide “support and cover” (支援掩护), its key mission in 
disputed areas. The exercise involved large numbers of vessels, including destroyers, 
auxiliaries, and submarines.164
Similar exercises also take place in the South China Sea. In late August 2016, for in-
stance, a “large-scale maritime rights-protection” exercise was held in the Gulf of Tonkin 
involving elements of the PLA (navy, ground forces, and air force) and various maritime 
law-enforcement entities, including the China Coast Guard, local-level FLE and CMS 
units, and the China Rescue and Salvage Service. One aim of the exercise was to improve 
the ability of the PLA and coast guard forces to conduct joint rights-protection opera-
tions, such as defending Chinese oil rigs from the type of assaults that Vietnam directed 
against CNOOC 981 in 2014.165 As will be discussed below, sometimes these exercises 
serve the political function of signaling Chinese intentions. But they also meet legitimate 
desires to improve interoperability.
When coast guard and naval forces are operating in the same area, logic suggests that the 
senior service should assume tactical command. Evidence indicates that this indeed oc-
curs, at least some of the time. While on patrol in the Spratlys in May 2013, for instance, 
the PLAN frigate Jiangmen “successfully organized coast guard vessels to investigate 
and expel [查证驱赶] several foreign fishing and transport vessels” operating without 
consent in Chinese-claimed waters.166
Part 3: Sea Power and Strategy
Echelon defense is an approach for using sea power to defend and advance China’s 
maritime claims. It employs a division of labor between China’s two primary sea ser-
vices, leveraging the particular advantages of each. This part examines the strategic and 
operational considerations underlying China’s echelon defense approach. It also outlines 
the chief functions it serves in China’s dispute strategy.167
“Rights” vs. “Stability”
China has powerful incentives to build and use instruments of coercion—including na-
val and coast guard forces—to advance its maritime interests. In Chinese parlance, such 
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actions often are referred to as “rights protection” (维权, weiquan). At the same time, 
however, Chinese leaders must weigh desires for gain against the potential consequences 
of zealous pursuit of claims. China has a strong interest in maintaining a healthy degree 
of stability in its relations with neighboring states, which Chinese policy makers believe 
is vital to maintaining an external environment congenial to its economic development. 
At the Sixteenth Party Congress (November 2002), the then Party leader Jiang Zemin 
introduced the concept of a “period of strategic opportunity.” He identified the first two 
decades of the twenty-first century as a time in which China would be able to focus on 
making itself strong and rich.168 Thus, while “rights protection” is extremely important 
to Chinese leaders, options to advance the country’s claims must be weighed against this 
emphasis on “maintaining stability” (维稳, weiwen) in China’s foreign relations.169 The 
decision to rely largely on coast guard forces backed up by the navy should be seen as a 
compromise between these two contradictory desires.
Bristling with armaments, naval warships are instruments and symbols of violence. The 
PLAN surface fleet has formidable combat capabilities, especially the modern platforms 
commissioned in the last five years. These vessels are equipped with missiles that can 
destroy targets well beyond the horizon, allowing them to influence foreign decisions 
even when they cannot be seen. Not surprisingly, this menacing aspect can exert a 
persuasive effect on a potential foe. However, it also can lead to risky escalation with a 
disputant who will not be cowed, and possibly armed intervention from a foreign great 
power. Moreover, relying too heavily on warships can undermine China’s efforts to craft 
an image of a state pursuing “peaceful development.”170 The PLA Navy is aware of the 
difficult balancing act it must perform. As then–ESF deputy commander Rear Adm. 
Zhang Huachen admitted, the PLA Navy “must both safeguard national interests from 
foreign violation and safeguard the stability of the overall situation. This is the Party’s 
policy. Fulfilling these requirements presents a great challenge to the navy.”171
Coast guard vessels, by contrast, are not typically instruments of war but of peacetime 
order. What armaments they possess have little or no utility on the modern battlefield. 
Yet in the peacetime struggle at sea they can perform a wide range of missions suc-
cessfully, and can do so without the negative repercussions that would accompany 
reliance on the navy. In the words of one PAP analyst, “Unlike naval forces, the coast 
guard enjoys exceptional advantages. As a representative of the Chinese government, 
it can use any means aside from use of force to conduct vigorous rights-protection law 
enforcement.”172 Moreover, constabulary actions do not offer outside powers a pretext to 
intervene.173 According to a textbook published by a top Chinese maritime university, 
“Using maritime law-enforcement forces to safeguard maritime rights and interests 
provides the state with much more room for maneuver than if it used the navy, and is 
therefore more beneficial for protecting the national image.”174 As one PLAN analyst 
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wrote, “[u]sing maritime law-enforcement forces to safeguard sovereignty allows the 
Party to avoid being criticized for ‘gunboat diplomacy’ and allows for protracted pres-
sure to be exerted on the adversary.”175
The “rights-stability” concept also guides when and how Beijing elects to use sea power 
in disputed waters. It has led to the development of at least two stratagems for pursuing 
the former without jeopardizing the latter.
First, China tends to seize on the minor provocations of another disputant, using them 
as a pretext for a response of greater vigor than the original offenses themselves.176 As a 
result, the other state both is a net loser in the exchange and is cast as the instigator of in-
creased tension. Macau University researcher You Ji calls this China’s “one-plus strategy.” 
Aside from Scarborough Shoal, the classic case is the 2012 Senkaku Islands imbroglio. 
The Japanese central government purchased three of the disputed islets from private 
owners to prevent the governor of Tokyo from doing so (and perhaps building on them). 
Thus, Japan was opting for the lesser of two evils. China’s response was far more escala-
tory. Immediately after the purchase transaction, PRC leaders initiated regular deploy-
ments of constabulary vessels to the territorial sea—operations intended to undermine 
Japan’s administration of the features.177
The one-plus stratagem is not acknowledged openly in Chinese sources. Rather, it is a 
theoretical construct that seems to fit the pattern of some PRC behavior. However, Chi-
nese officials do admit openly the punitive nature of their approach. For instance, while 
speaking at a 2014 event, an SOA official said that it is China’s “principled stance” (原则
立场) to force states that provoke China to pay a “corresponding price” (相应的代价).178
Second, Chinese expansion takes place on the basis of proactive changes to the status 
quo. To avoid engendering instability, these actions often take place unobtrusively, 
resulting in a gradual undermining of other states’ claims. This preference for incremen-
talism is a widely recognized characteristic of China’s approach.179 For instance, while 
appearing on a current affairs program in July 2015, Shi Yinhong, a civilian researcher 
with close ties to the party-state, and Li Jie, an analyst from a PLAN research institute, 
agreed that China’s maritime dispute strategy in the South China Sea was described best 
as bubu weiying (步步为营)—“building fortifications after each new advance.”180
Not all decisions about how to handle China’s maritime disputes are made on the basis 
of strategy. Sometimes parochial interests may intrude on the policy-making process. 
For many years, Chinese maritime law-enforcement agencies vied with each other for 
influence and acclaim. Surely some decisions were made in the interest of advancing 
bureaucratic interests. To the extent that this thesis ever offered a plausible explana-
tion for China’s seaward expansion since 2006—and the case never has been made 
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persuasively—the 2013 CCG reform should dampen local activism as a factor driving 
Chinese behavior at sea.181
To some degree, Chinese leaders are driven to act for the sake of domestic legitimacy— 
that is, the need to show the Chinese people that the Chinese Communist Party is 
defending the honor and interests of the Chinese nation. This factor is probably most 
salient when Chinese leaders are faced with a sudden incident with another state, espe-
cially a state that historically has “bullied” China (e.g., the United States and Japan).182 In 
such cases, Chinese leaders may experience some pressure to respond. However, because 
the Chinese Communist Party—operating through the Central Propaganda Depart-
ment—has broad powers to decide which narratives are presented to the Chinese people, 
Chinese leaders are not nearly as vulnerable to domestic pressure as those in democratic 
states.183
The Functions of Sea Power in Chinese Dispute Strategy
Where expedient, China prefers to place maritime law-enforcement vessels on the 
front line in rights-protection operations, where they serve two primary functions: they 
manifest or embody China’s maritime claim; and they forcibly assert, or enforce, these 
claims through coercive actions at sea.184 With its modern combat capabilities, the PLAN 
surface fleet primarily operates on the second line, where it serves to discourage escala-
tion. Both services perform the fourth major function of sea power in Chinese dispute 
strategy: intelligence collection.
Manifest China’s Claims. By being present in disputed waters, Chinese vessels embody 
or manifest China’s claims. Depending on the circumstances, presence can exert one 
or more political effects. First, it shows Chinese administration, thereby bolstering a 
narrative of Chinese ownership. Second, it demonstrates to other disputants China’s 
commitment to its claims. In this sense, Chinese presence operations are analogous to 
USN freedom-of-navigation “operational assertions.” Third, sending ships to contested 
areas to manifest China’s claims provides a means by which Beijing can exert pressure on 
other states to comply with its wishes. This pressure differs from a threat because it is an 
action that already has been taken. Its coercive value lies in another state’s desire for it to 
end. Both coast guard and naval forces perform operations that serve this function, but 
less-threatening coast guard cutters are often the preferred instrument.
Enforce China’s Claims. Chinese constabulary vessels and warships also may be tasked 
with forcibly asserting—or enforcing—China’s claims by directly vying for control 
in disputed areas. In such cases, Chinese ships serve as instruments of low-intensity 
conflict. This ability distinguishes surface vessels from other tools of national power. 
Chinese ships can threaten foreign vessels with a whole range of measures and can fol-
low through on many threats, without using armed force. For instance, they can damage 
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foreign vessels and endanger foreign crews by targeting them with powerful water can-
non, destroying or confiscating equipment, and even bumping and ramming.185
Enforcing China’s claims is an end in and of itself; that is, it achieves the aim of exercis-
ing administrative control over Chinese-claimed waters, ensuring that China can enjoy 
the economic, security, and other benefits of that control. But doing so also serves 
political aims. In taking action, China follows through with threats, providing a fund 
of credibility for future threats. Forcibly asserting China’s rights to use and administer 
disputed waters is also a more coercive means of pressuring other disputants to comply 
with China’s wishes.
Operations to enforce China’s maritime claims are performed primarily by coast guard 
forces. There are, however, limits to the white-hull/gray-hull distinction. The PLAN sur-
face fleet is far more active along China’s maritime frontier than commonly is assumed. 
Navy warships do not simply lurk beyond the horizon while coast guard and militia 
forces commit the actual acts of aggression. The PLA Navy has an enforcement function, 
and it sometimes performs it.186
Discourage Escalation. PLAN surface ships serve certain key functions that coast guard 
cutters cannot, because of their lack of modern armaments. When a surface vessel has 
real combat capabilities, its presence in disputed areas assumes a more menacing aspect. 
This ability not only to communicate but to follow through with threats makes naval 
forces superior instruments of deterrence. A warship conveys the will and ability to act if 
some redline is crossed.187
The PLAN surface fleet does not do this alone. Indeed, the full power-projection ca-
pabilities of the Chinese military as a whole constitute a latent threat to foreign leaders 
considering certain policy actions. However, the PLAN surface fleet’s ability to provide 
targeted threats by maintaining protracted, visible presence in an area under dispute 
distinguishes it from other forms of military power.188
Prior to 2006, there was little impetus for the PLA Navy to serve this deterrent function. 
Rather, the need has arisen from concern that the expansion of China’s own frontline 
activities might elicit an armed response. This important strategic dynamic is well 
recognized in Chinese sources. As one authoritative PLAN source put it, while patrolling 
disputed waters, the navy “shows the military’s resolve and capability to actively support 
rights-protection law-enforcement operations.”189 In a 2012 interview, senior CMS of-
ficer Sun Shuxian acknowledged that having coast guard and naval forces maintain close 
coordination is vital to ensuring that the former do not “get pushed around” (吃亏). In 
Sun’s words, “We must always maintain military deterrence. If a neighboring state uses 
force against one of our maritime law-enforcement vessels, it will suffer a devastating 
assault.”190
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The vehicle for PLAN presence in disputed waters is the “combat readiness patrol” (战备
巡逻).191 When conducted to deter foreign aggression against unarmed or lightly armed 
vessels, these operations are called “support and cover” (支援掩护).192 The most com-
mon PLAN approach for conducting this mission is to operate twenty to thirty nautical 
miles away from frontline coast guard forces, depending on the circumstances, prepared 
to intervene if necessary.193 This presence forms the second line in China’s echelon 
defense system.
In recent years, as the PLA Navy has expanded the geographic scope of its operations, 
these patrols have become one segment of longer missions that may take a task force 
beyond the first island chain into the Pacific Ocean. These missions are called “combat 
readiness patrols and far seas training” (战备巡逻远海训练). Chinese sources readily 
acknowledge their political importance. One such mission occurred from January to 
February 2014 and involved a PLAN surface flotilla comprising a Type 071 LPD (Chang-
baishan), a Type 052C destroyer (Haikou), and a Type 052B destroyer (Wuhan). The 
twenty-three-day voyage covered eight thousand miles, taking the formation through 
disputed waters in the South China Sea, into the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, 
and returning via the East China Sea. On arrival in Zhanjiang, the task force was met 
by the then PLAN deputy political commissar Vice Adm. Wang Sentai (王森泰) and 
the then PLAN political commissar, Adm. Liu Xiaojiang (刘晓江). In his speech, Wang 
stated that the mission had “fully demonstrated China’s resolve to safeguard national 
sovereignty and maritime rights and interests.”194
Aside from forward-presence operations, the PLAN surface fleet also communicates 
deterrence signals through military exercises. One noteworthy example took place in 
October 2012, during a tense period in China-Japan relations over the Senkaku Islands. 
The PLA Navy, China Marine Surveillance, and Fisheries Law Enforcement conducted 
a very public joint exercise in the East China Sea. In the exercise scenario, a coast guard 
ship was rammed by a foreign naval vessel in disputed waters. The PLA Navy was called 
to the scene to assist the damaged ship and protect Chinese administrative presence.195 
The timing, location, content, and publicity of the exercise clearly suggest that the 
purpose was to signal Chinese resolve to dispatch the navy if Japan responded forcibly 
to China’s recent dramatic increase in coast guard patrols to the Senkakus. As one PLAN 
officer pointed out, “With this exercise, we amply showed China’s ability and determina-
tion to safeguard territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests.”196
More recently, the Chinese fleet played an important signaling role in the days leading 
up to and following a legal decision that an UNCLOS tribunal issued on the validity of 
Chinese claims and the legitimacy of the country’s actions in disputed parts of the South 
China Sea. In late June and early July 2016, the Chinese military conducted a number 
of very public exercises in the South China Sea.197 The most important of these was a 
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massive live-fire exercise that took place near the Paracels on July 9. Over one hundred 
ships and dozens of aircraft from all three fleets participated in a simulated great-power 
war at sea. The PLA Navy officially insisted this was a “routine exercise,” but Li Jie, a 
naval analyst at the PLA NRI, admitted that it was intended to “show China’s power and 
capabilities, send a warning to extraregional powers, and convey a serious statement to 
regional powers.” With the exercise, China “showed its resolve to defend maritime rights 
and interests and maritime territory.”198
If deterrence fails, the presence of PLAN surface vessels gives the PRC an option to 
respond immediately with force and ensure that China is not on the losing side of any 
armed clash. As one researcher at China’s National Defense University put it, placing the 
PLA Navy on the second line means that “any opponent with the audacity to escalate 
from contention between coast guards to a combat operation will suffer a catastrophic 
armed response from China.”199 In this context, the navy serves as a “backstop” (后盾) 
and provides “security guarantees” (安全保障) for the constabulary fleet as it operates 
on the front line.200
Not being the side to fire first is a much-emphasized part of the PLA identity. If force is 
used against Chinese state vessels, the PLA Navy would be expected to respond in kind. 
This principle often is captured in the phrase (first uttered by Mao Zedong) “If nobody 
attacks me, then I won’t attack. But if somebody does attack me, I must counterattack” 
(人不犯我, 我不犯人, 人若犯我, 我必犯人).201 Speaking in similar terms, Vice Adm. 
Huang Jiaxiang stated, “We’ll never fire the first shot, but if the other side fires the first 
shot, we will resolutely counterattack.”202 PLAN scholar Sr. Capt. Zhang Wei claims 
that China’s doctrine is to “never fire the first shot, but not to let the other side fire the 
second shot.”203
Even if one accepts that the “doctrine of the second shot” reflects PLA orthodoxy—and 
there is reason to believe that it may not—it may be applied cynically.204 For example, 
video footage of the March 1988 Johnson Reef conflict suggests that the PLA Navy 
goaded the Vietnamese to fire first, providing it with a pretext for what ultimately turned 
into a massacre of dozens of Vietnamese troops.205
Collect Intelligence. Intelligence operations indirectly contribute to China’s maritime 
dispute strategy by providing Chinese civilian and military leaders with a timely, ac-
curate “picture” of foreign activities in disputed areas.206 Intelligence collection is a core 
mission of China’s constabulary forces. In a 2013 interview, a CMS officer acknowledged 
that when patrolling disputed waters, one of the service’s key functions is to monitor 
foreign infringements, a mission he euphemistically called “understanding what’s going 
on” (了解情况). If other states violate Chinese rights, Chinese law-enforcement entities 
“must be the first to know.”207 This mission often is framed in legal terms: tracking and 
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documenting the activities of foreign vessels and aircraft are described as “collecting 
evidence” (取证).
China Marine Surveillance had and the China Coast Guard now has special units called 
“rights-protection law-enforcement detachments” (one for each regional branch) to 
perform intelligence-collection functions. These detachments, set up in 2008, embark a 
handful of personnel on ships sailing to disputed waters. These personnel handle verbal 
communications with foreign mariners, document these encounters with photographs 
and video footage, file reports, and transmit information to commanders ashore.208
Intelligence collection, of course, is a very important function of PLAN surface vessels. 
When ships are at sea, they actively monitor and document all ships and aircraft they en-
counter, using data links to keep shore-based commanders fully apprised in real time.209 
For instance, during a two-month-plus patrol to the Spratlys that began in August 2014, 
the PLAN frigate Huai’nan identified more than four hundred “suspicious targets.” This 
provided shore-based commanders with “accurate information” with which to make 
timely decisions.210
PLAN ships deploy analogues to USN “snoopy teams,” called “evidence-collection 
personnel” (取证员).211 In October 2013, the Chinese LST Jiuhuashan was on patrol 
when it discovered an unknown fishing vessel operating in “sensitive waters” in the East 
China Sea. The LST’s crew proceeded to track the foreign trawler, taking photos and 
video footage until it departed the area. The onboard “security officer” (保卫干事) then 
processed these materials and cataloged them as “evidence” of a foreign violation.212
This collection effort is an important component of the surface-fleet mission in disputed 
waters. However, the fleet is less effective than aviation assets such as unmanned aerial 
vehicles and fixed-wing aircraft—which can cover a much larger swath of ocean—and 
Chinese fishing vessels, which are far more numerous.213
China relies on coast guard and naval forces to defend and advance its position in its 
maritime disputes. Chinese leaders assign many frontline rights-protection missions 
to the unarmed or lightly armed constabulary fleet. These missions involve sailing to 
disputed waters to manifest and enforce China’s maritime claims. However, there are 
some functions that only warships can perform. Where activities in disputed areas risk 
a foreign response, China may deploy gray-hulled naval vessels to discourage escala-
tion, influencing foreign decisions from afar. When forward deployed, units of both 
sea services actively collect intelligence on foreign activities in the air, on the water, and 
beneath the sea.
Decisions about how Chinese leaders use the country’s two sea services—which mis-
sions are performed, when, and by which service—reflect strategic considerations 
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openly acknowledged in Chinese sources and suggested through patterns of behavior. 
Chinese policy makers seek to use the country’s growing power to diminish foreign 
influence over Chinese-claimed land and sea areas, but their decisions are constrained 
by another strong desire to maintain stability in China’s foreign relations. Chinese lead-
ers have adopted at least two stratagems to enable the country to pursue rights better 
without jeopardizing stability. China’s most assertive behavior often comes in the wake 
of minor provocations from other states. Moreover, Beijing has opted for a gradualist 
approach, which some Chinese analysts describe as “building fortifications after each 
new advance.”
Table 4 outlines the four primary functions served by naval and coast guard forces in 
China’s dispute strategy.
Part 4: Echelon Defense
China’s naval and coast guard forces generally are arrayed in what Chinese strategists 
call an “echelon defense” posture. Maritime law-enforcement vessels perform most, but 
not all, frontline operations to manifest and enforce China’s maritime claims. The PLA 
Navy operates on the second line, where its presence serves to warn foreign leaders 
against responding forcefully to the assertive behavior of China’s frontline forces, and 
to intervene if deterrence fails. What follows is a close examination of the five primary 
frontline operations that Chinese forces perform: sovereignty patrol, blockade, tracking 
and monitoring, obstruction and eviction, and escort. Where possible, this analysis also 
includes data about the disposition of naval forces on the second line in China’s echelon 
defense approach, performing a sixth type of operation: support and cover.
Function Performed By Description
Manifest China’s 
maritime claims
Mostly CCG Maintain presence in disputed waters. Serves to
1. Uphold the narrative of Chinese ownership
2. Communicate China’s commitment to its claims
3. Pressure other disputants to comply with Chinese wishes
Enforce China’s 
maritime claims
Mostly CCG Forcibly assert PRC claims by using threats and nonlethal 
measures against foreign mariners operating “illegally” in 
Chinese-claimed waters. Serves to
1.  Follow through with threats made by Chinese diplomats/
statesmen (to ensure the credibility of future threats)
2. Pressure other disputants to comply with Chinese wishes
3. Control Chinese-claimed waters
Discourage foreign 
escalation
PLAN only Maintain presence in disputed areas to convey a threat of 
consequences if another state escalates or intervenes
Collect intelligence Both services Track and report on foreign activities in Chinese-claimed areas
Table 4. The Functions of Sea Power in Chinese Dispute Strategy
Notes: CCG = China Coast Guard; PLAN = People’s Liberation Army Navy; PRC = People’s Republic of China.
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Sovereignty Patrol
Chinese coast guard and naval forces can influence island disputes through the conduct 
of two types of frontline operations. First, by sailing to waters adjacent to a disputed 
feature, Chinese forces can manifest Beijing’s claim to that feature. Such missions, herein 
called “sovereignty patrols,” serve a whole range of political functions, from bolstering 
a narrative of Chinese ownership to exerting pressure on foreign leaders. (As discussed 
in the next section, the PRC also uses sea power to blockade access to certain disputed 
features as a means to assert control over the features themselves.)
Whenever an element of the Chinese surface fleet approaches within twelve nautical 
miles of a disputed feature, this is a political act. The political objectives may differ, 
depending on the particular circumstances. Indeed, in any given case Chinese leaders no 
doubt seek to achieve more than one objective. Sometimes these sovereignty patrols take 
place during crises; more often they occur on the pretext of routine administration of 
“Chinese” sovereign territory.
China’s policy for managing its dispute with Japan over the Senkaku Islands relies very 
heavily on the sovereignty patrol. For decades, China’s claim to the features was almost 
entirely theoretical. Chinese diplomats told their Japanese counterparts that the islands 
were China’s. Chinese newspapers and textbooks stated this was the case. However, with 
very few exceptions, PRC authority never actually extended there.214
This changed in 2008, when Chinese leaders decided to establish an administrative pres-
ence near the features. In December of that year, two CMS cutters entered the territo-
rial sea of the Senkaku Islands and lingered for some nine hours.215 In service lore, this 
operation is known as the “12-8 Patrol,” for the month and day on which it took place. 
The mission commander was instructed to “show presence, manifest jurisdiction, and 
declare sovereignty.”216
Unlike later sovereignty patrols to the Senkakus, the 12-8 Patrol was not framed as a 
reaction to some Japanese “provocation.” It occurred during a period of rapid expansion 
in Chinese coast guard presence in disputed waters. Like other such operations, the 12-8 
Patrol was conceived at least in part to communicate China’s commitment to its claim. 
More importantly, perhaps, the mission was seen as necessary to bolster the legitimacy 
of China’s position. Chinese decision makers likely had come to believe that China’s 
claim to the features was weakened by its total acquiescence to Japanese administra-
tion. Not long before the 12-8 Patrol took place, vice-commandant of China Marine 
Surveillance Sun Shuxian publicly explained, “Internationally, there are two customs 
[惯例] with respect to disputed waters. One is whether or not you have exercised ef-
fective management [over the disputed area] and the second is that effective control is 
superior to historical evidence. In our case, this area is ours, and it was so beginning 
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with our ancestors. But this alone is of no use. One must show effective control. China 
Marine Surveillance must show presence and manifest jurisdiction in our jurisdictional 
waters.”217
During the two years following the 12-8 Patrol, no Chinese vessels sailed to the fea-
tures.218 This changed in the wake of two crises, one in 2010, the other in 2012. On 
September 7, 2010, while piloting the 166-ton trawler Minjinyu 5179 near the Senkaku 
Islands, a Chinese fishing captain named Zhan Qixiong intentionally rammed his vessel 
into two JCG ships.219 Japan detained Zhan and his crew and impounded the vessel.
When it became clear that the Chinese fishermen would not be released immediately, 
the PRC responded by issuing formal protests through diplomatic channels and delay-
ing bilateral meetings set to take place later that month.220 Japanese authorities released 
fourteen of the crewmembers and the trawler on September 13 and 14, respectively. 
However, the captain remained in custody and faced the possibility of prosecution, and 
perhaps jail time.
When Zhan’s detention was extended on September 19, China began taking more-
forceful actions to pressure Japan to release him. PRC diplomats and statesmen publicly 
threatened serious consequences and suspended governmental exchanges. China also 
arrested four Japanese citizens working in China to dispose of World War II–era chemi-
cals, charging them with espionage—a blatant act of hostage taking.221 It also may have 
enacted informal economic sanctions by halting the export of rare earths—inputs vital 
to the Japanese economy.222 Japanese officials released Zhan on September 24, openly 
acknowledging that PRC pressure tactics ultimately forced this decision.223
Chinese coast guard forces played a key role in China’s handling of the crisis. Immedi-
ately after Fisheries Law Enforcement learned of the disappearance of Minjinyu 5179, it 
sent two cutters (FLE 201 and FLE 202) to the area to guard Chinese fishing vessels still 
operating there.224 On Minjinyu 5179’s release, the ship sailed back to China under the 
escort of FLE 202 and two Chinese trawlers. Later in the month, when China sought to 
increase pressure on Japan to release Zhan Qixiong, it sent back FLE 201 and a second 
cutter, FLE 203, to waters just outside the territorial sea, this time with a Chinese re-
porter aboard to increase pressure on Japan and show Chinese citizens that the leader-
ship was doing something.225
The biggest significance of the 2010 incident was not that Chinese actions at sea had 
effected the release of Zhan Qixiong. They did not; their use was just one tool of many 
that Chinese leaders employed to exert pressure on Japan. Rather, this event provided 
a pretext for establishing a larger administrative footprint near the Senkakus. An FLE 
official portended this outcome in a statement made in the days following Zhan’s release: 
“Going forward, Fisheries Law Enforcement will begin normalizing patrols to waters 
38 china maritime studies
near Diaoyu [Uotsuri] Island.”226 In the months following the incident, Chinese constab-
ulary vessels indeed operated occasionally near the disputed features. For example, three 
FLE cutters sailed to waters near the Senkakus on October 24. In three instances—oc-
curring in August 2011, March 2012, and July 2012—Chinese ships actually entered the 
territorial sea.227
An article that appeared in the SOA-owned China Ocean News in the days following the 
second of these intrusions sheds further light on the rationale for normalizing patrols 
to the Senkakus. Published under the byline of “maritime current affairs commentator 
Dong Mu” (a pseudonym), the article states that, given their status as representatives 
of the state, constabulary vessels allow China to “use positive action to reiterate China’s 
consistent position with respect to its sovereignty over Diaoyu Island and its associated 
islets.”228 The purpose of these operations, then, was to reinforce China’s claims through 
physical presence.
Real “normalization” of Senkaku patrols did not begin until September 2012, following 
a second crisis. As mentioned earlier, the Japanese central government purchased three 
of the disputed islets from private owners to preempt others from doing so—an action 
meant to preserve, not alter, the status quo. China responded with a dramatic expansion 
in the frequency of sovereignty patrols to adjacent waters, including the territorial sea.
To some extent, authoritative Chinese claims that these actions were aimed at sending 
a message to Japanese leaders—a declaration of “China’s firm determination to defend 
sovereignty and maritime rights and interests”—may be taken at face value.229 Japan’s 
“nationalization” of the Senkakus may have been perceived as an affront to Chinese 
leader Hu Jintao, who personally requested that Japan not take this measure.230 More-
over, Japan’s public denial of the existence of a territorial dispute no doubt gave impetus 
to the dispatch of Chinese vessels to prove the absurdity of this claim.231
However, Beijing’s asymmetrical response suggests that Chinese leaders were looking 
for a pretext to establish a firmer foothold in these waters. That is, this was a clear-cut 
example of the “one-plus strategy,” which the outcome of the Scarborough Shoal incident 
(just three months earlier) had shown to be a winning approach to dispute management. 
China’s biweekly coast guard patrols, which continue to this day, directly undermine 
Japan’s administration of the Senkakus, to the point that Japan now no longer exercises 
effective control.232
To date, only coast guard vessels have conducted sovereignty patrols to the Senkakus. 
Presumably, Chinese leaders have judged that naval presence in sovereign Japanese 
waters would cross a redline and risk conflict. However, Chinese naval vessels gradually 
are pushing the limit. In June 2016, for the first time, a PLAN surface combatant sailed 
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through the contiguous zone (i.e., the 12 nm belt just outside the territorial sea) of one of 
the islands.233
More importantly, the surge of coast guard presence near the Senkakus that began in 
September 2012 appears to have been accompanied by PLAN surface fleet deployments 
to signal a commitment to protect China’s new foothold. Chinese warships patrolled wa-
ters near the Senkakus through the worst of the crisis, and perhaps longer.234 Responding 
to a question about the PLA Navy’s role in the Senkaku dispute with Japan, Xing Guang-
mei, an analyst from a PLAN research institute, claimed, “The navy has adopted the 
common international approach, whereby maritime law enforcement is on the front line 
and naval forces are nearby patrolling and providing support and cover. Thus, whenever 
anybody sees China Marine Surveillance vessels patrolling on the front line, the navy is 
definitely nearby awaiting orders. Once our law-enforcement forces encounter danger, 
the navy will immediately be on its way to help.”235
China’s policies for using sea power as an instrument for handling the Senkaku dispute 
are influenced strongly by Japan’s status as a great power, allied to a superpower. China 
must be very careful that it does not cross a redline that results in an armed clash and 
perhaps even a regional conflict.
In the South China Sea, China faces no such adversary. Chinese surface vessels routinely 
conduct sovereignty patrols to many, if not most, of the disputed features in the South 
China Sea. Moreover, they do so without the need for the pretext of a foreign provoca-
tion. Chinese constabulary forces, lightly armed and operating on the basis of provid-
ing routine law enforcement, are particularly well suited for this type of operation. The 
vehicle for the CCG presence near disputed features is the “regular rights-protection 
patrol” (定期维权巡航).236
Sovereignty patrols to James Shoal merit special attention. This feature appears on Chi-
nese maps and is depicted no differently from any other land feature. However, the shoal 
is submerged under roughly twenty meters of water. No artful distortion of interna-
tional law can justify Chinese ownership of this section of seabed deep within Malaysia’s 
EEZ.237
And yet Chinese coast guard and naval vessels on occasion sail to these waters deep in 
the southern part of the South China Sea, hover above the shoal, hold oath-taking cer-
emonies, and sometimes drop stone sovereignty markers into the ocean.238 For instance, 
on the morning of March 26, 2013, sailors aboard the Type 071 LPD Jinggangshan held 
a ceremony on the ship’s flight deck in which they declared the following: “We are the 
sailors of the glorious South Sea Fleet. Here, facing the national flag at the motherland’s 
James Shoal, we solemnly swear to follow the command of the Party; be able to fight 
and win wars; be upright in behavior; plant roots in the South China Sea, do great deeds 
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in the South China Sea, and guard the South China Sea; resolutely safeguard national 
sovereignty; and work hard to achieve the dream of building China into a powerful 
country.”239
Chinese vessels conduct sovereignty patrols to James Shoal to assert China’s claim to 
these waters, which fall within the nine-dash line. Indeed, in the words of one authorita-
tive source, the act of dropping a sovereignty marker allows China to “quietly express 
its strong will” to defend its sovereignty.240 However, there is at least one domestic factor 
driving these patrols. From childhood, Chinese citizens learn that James Shoal is “the 
southernmost extent of Chinese territory” (中国领土的最南端, or 中国领土的最南
点).241 If this narrative is to have any credibility, representatives of the Chinese state 
actually must go there from time to time. In this respect, then, Chinese ships serve to 
perpetuate a national myth.
Blockade
Scarborough Shoal proved that Chinese naval and coast guard forces have the ability to 
seize disputed land features without resorting to armed force. After the standoff ended 
in June 2012, Chinese coast guard forces physically began preventing Philippine fishing 
and constabulary vessels from accessing the shoal, daring Philippine leaders to escalate 
and American leaders to intervene.242 Neither did.
In the context of China’s peacetime dispute strategy, a blockade is a maritime operation 
designed to exercise control over a land feature by interdicting seaborne communica-
tions to that feature. Chinese ships rely on threats to discourage foreign vessels from ap-
proaching and, if necessary, resort to nonlethal measures to force them to depart. These 
may include bumping and firing water cannon.243
Even if armed force is not used, blockading foreign access to a disputed land feature is an 
extremely provocative act that easily could lead to the negative outcomes that Chinese 
leaders seek to avoid: an armed clash, a damaged reputation, and foreign intervention. 
The case of Scarborough Shoal suggests certain preconditions for success. These include 
a suitable pretext for action (in this case, the arrest of Chinese fishermen) and signs of 
passivity from other disputants and their allies.
These conditions were not present in early 2014, when China attempted to blockade 
Philippine access to another disputed feature, this time in the Spratlys. Second Thomas 
Shoal (also known as Ayungin Shoal and Ren’ai Shoal) is a teardrop-shaped feature 
located about one hundred nautical miles west of Palawan—well within the Philippine 
EEZ. It is fully submerged at high tide; therefore it is not entitled to a territorial sea. It 
sits in the shadow of China’s massive new installation at Mischief Reef, just twenty nauti-
cal miles to its west.
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In 1999, a few years following China’s occupation of Mischief Reef, the Philippines 
grounded a World War II–era troop transport vessel (BRP Sierra Madre) at Second 
Thomas Shoal. Since then, it has stationed a tiny garrison of marines on the dilapidated 
hulk. The garrison is entirely reliant on regular resupply from Palawan by ship, making it 
very vulnerable to blockade.244
For years, the PRC approach consisted of verbal complaints. This changed in 2013, when 
Chinese maritime law-enforcement vessels first established a regular presence near 
Second Thomas Shoal in May of that year.245 However, as late as August, CCG vessels 
did little more than patrol and monitor the feature.246 Then, in March 2014, CCG ships 
attempted to prevent Philippine supply vessels from reaching Sierra Madre to replenish 
the garrison, escalating what had been a presence mission to the level of an enforcement 
operation.247
China’s attempted blockade failed. Philippine leaders clearly were committed to main-
taining their foothold at the shoal. They had learned their own lessons from Scarbor-
ough Shoal, and since the Philippines actually occupied Second Thomas Shoal, more was 
at stake. Acting under the spotlight of the international press, Beijing proved unwilling 
to take the steps needed to halt Philippine access to the feature forcibly—i.e., bumping, 
ramming, and other types of soft force. The Philippines did not offer China the needed 
pretext for action. Moreover, it appears that in this case the United States took a more 
proactive approach to supporting its ally. For instance, the U.S. Navy deployed patrol 
aircraft to the area during supply runs to signal American opposition to the attempted 
blockade and to intimidate the coast guard forces implementing it.248
Since a contested blockade rests on continuous, vigilant presence and the willingness to 
use coercive measures if necessary, it is both expensive and risky. A political agreement 
that recognizes the new status quo is naturally far more preferable. Recent developments 
at Scarborough Shoal show how the pressure of successful enforcement coupled with 
economic and other inducements can lead to the political outcome Chinese leaders seek. 
The new Philippine administration of President Rodrigo Duterte has accepted PRC 
control over Scarborough Shoal and has sought accommodation on that basis. As part 
of a political détente between the two countries—which promises economic and other 
benefits for the Philippines—China began allowing some Philippine fishermen to access 
the feature in the second half of 2016. This was not a return to the status quo ante—Chi-
na retains administrative control over the feature. But by making a small concession and 
offering modest inducements in the form of economic investment, it has gained tacit 
acceptance of this control, reduced tensions, and a total reorientation of the Philippines’ 
foreign policy toward closer ties with China and a corresponding downgrading in U.S.-
Philippine relations.249
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Tracking and Monitoring
China’s sea services help Chinese leaders defend and advance the country’s “maritime 
rights”—that is, the PRC’s claimed rights to use and administer certain sections of the 
ocean that it bases on China’s particular interpretation of international law. On the lower 
end of the escalation spectrum, they may track and monitor foreign “infringements,” an 
operation aimed at manifesting China’s claims and collecting intelligence. The primary 
targets are foreign fishing vessels and survey ships.
The East China Sea has been the setting for a number of such operations. For example, 
in July 2004 Japan began hydrocarbon exploration in the East China Sea, hiring the Nor-
wegian surveying vessel Ramform Victory for the purpose. Since China claims resource 
and other maritime rights out to the Okinawa Trough (well east of the median line be-
tween its coast and Japan’s), it regarded these surveying operations as an infringement.250
PRC leaders called on China Marine Surveillance to deploy cutters to track and monitor 
developments and to engage in verbal harassment. These operations, which continued 
through 2005, apparently did not involve behavior that seriously threatened the safety 
of the ship and crew of Ramform Victory. According to Chinese sources, China Marine 
Surveillance conducted a total of 146 aircraft patrols (架次) and eighteen ship patrols 
(艘次), during which servicemembers recorded 807 minutes of video footage and 7,232 
photographs of Japanese “infringements” and communicated bridge to bridge more 
than five hundred minutes of verbal protest (喊话—literally, “yelling words”).251 These 
were the metrics that mattered. Such operations served to signal Chinese displeasure 
and to manifest physically China’s claim to jurisdiction over these waters.252 In the words 
of CMS officer Yu Zhirong, their purpose was to “show the attitude and position of the 
Chinese government.” 253
Obstruction and Eviction
Chinese naval and coast guard forces sometimes are authorized to impede the op-
erations of foreign vessels in Chinese-claimed waters actively. In many cases, verbal 
threats—accompanied by the use of floodlights and loud sirens—are enough, especially 
when a threat is transmitted from the bridge of China’s larger and more menacing 
ships.254 When verbal threats fail to bring compliance, Chinese forces may take forcible 
measures to compel foreign ships to cease their activities. Chinese coast guard vessels are 
equipped with advanced water cannon that can reach targets up to one hundred meters 
away and damage sensitive ship hardware such as radar and communications equip-
ment.255 Chinese ships also may threaten collision, and even may bump foreign vessels 
intentionally.256
Foreign fishing trawlers are the most common victims of these enforcement operations. 
Most such activities are conducted in the South China Sea, about which few fisheries 
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agreements exist. China regularly “expels” (驱离 or 驱赶) Vietnamese fishing vessels op-
erating near the Paracel Islands. In the Spratlys, China prevents foreign fishermen from 
using waters near Chinese-controlled features, but seldom in other areas.
Indeed, there remain large sections of the South China Sea in which foreign fishermen 
continue to operate unmolested. The great distance from the Chinese mainland, coupled 
with the vast area of ocean to be patrolled, has created practical challenges for Chinese 
law-enforcement forces operating there.257 Moreover, when Chinese forces compel a 
foreign fishing vessel to leave a given area, there is nothing to prevent it from returning 
or sailing to another area. China has not asserted exclusive fishing rights in all sec-
tions within the nine-dash line—at least, not yet. Lastly, China has yet to draw baselines 
around Scarborough Shoal or the Spratlys. Thus, it has no declared EEZ to enforce in 
these waters.
Both naval and coast guard forces impose Chinese prerogatives on foreign fishermen. 
Because managing fisheries is a classic constabulary role and because China seeks to 
avoid conjuring images of Chinese warships bullying tiny foreign fishing trawlers, coast 
guard cutters perform the bulk of the work. Prior to 2013, this chiefly had been the 
responsibility of Fisheries Law Enforcement; now it falls within the purview of the China 
Coast Guard as a whole.258
The PLA Navy also conducts these types of operations, presumably when coast guard 
vessels are absent. For instance, in February 2011 the Chinese frigate Dongguan fired 
three warning shots to evict a Philippine fishing vessel anchored at Jackson Atoll in the 
Spratlys.259 In September 2012, the PLAN frigate Shaoguan conducted a thirty-four-day 
patrol of the Paracels, during which it “investigated and expelled” (查证驱离) seventeen 
foreign vessels, probably all Vietnamese trawlers.260 On March 20, 2013, the Type 037 
subchaser Wanning pursued and fired on a Vietnamese fishing vessel operating near the 
Paracels.261
Foreign surveying vessels operating in Chinese-claimed waters are the second major 
target of Chinese surface-force operations. In 2011, CMS and FLE ships tracked and 
interfered with the operations of several surveying vessels hired by the Philippines 
and Vietnam. In March of that year, CMS 71 and CMS 75 drove away Veritas Voyager, 
which had been operating near Reed Bank, north of the Spratlys.262 In May 2011, CMS 
84 cut the towed cable of Binh Minh 2, a surveying vessel owned by PetroVietnam, as it 
conducted surveys east of Nha Trang, in waters within the nine-dash line.263 Binh Minh 
2 suffered a similar fate in November 2012, in waters south of the Paracels. In June 2011, 
at least two FLE cutters conducted a joint operation with Chinese fishing vessels (prob-
ably piloted by militiamen) to destroy streamers that Viking II was towing as it surveyed 
waters off the southern coast of Vietnam (within the nine-dash line).264
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The PLA Navy also has targeted foreign surveying vessels. In 2012, the minesweeper 
Luxi encountered a Vietnamese surveying vessel under escort by three armed trawlers 
near Triton Island in the Paracels. Luxi outmaneuvered the trawlers and aggressively ap-
proached the surveying ship, forcing it to depart the area.265
Chinese forces also obstruct foreign surveying vessels operating in disputed waters in 
the East China Sea. Again, Chinese coast guard forces are the main protagonists in these 
missions. In February 2012, CMS 66 interfered with the operations of the unarmed JCG 
surveying ship Shoyo (HL 01) operating twenty nautical miles east of the Chunxiao gas 
fields. On the evening of February 19, the Chinese vessel threatened Shoyo by approach-
ing within 0.3 nm, forcing it to halt its operations. The Japanese ship, accompanied by a 
second JCG vessel, Takuyo (HL 02), reportedly departed the area the next morning. This 
was one of at least three such incidents in the East China Sea between 2010 and 2012.266
Escort
Chinese coast guard and naval forces safeguard the economic activities of Chinese civil-
ians—witting and unwitting actors in the country’s dispute strategy. Together, they assert 
China’s maritime rights, above all the right to exploit resources in the water and seabed. 
The fleet underwrites their activities by ensuring their safety and preventing foreign 
intimidation. Often, protection is provided by means of physically “escorting” (护航) 
Chinese vessels as they operate in disputed waters.
Chinese efforts to exploit disputed waters are driven to some extent by a desire to reap 
the material benefits that may accrue from these activities. That is, there is a profit mo-
tive for Chinese civilians who are bold enough to go to disputed areas and an economic 
incentive for the government to encourage them to do so.267 But clearly, Chinese leaders 
also support these initiatives because they are a means to manifest and enforce China’s 
claims. At an October 2012 maritime affairs conference in Hainan, then–SOA director 
Liu Cigui outlined this line of reasoning as follows: 
Hainan Province’s strategic position is extremely important. Earnestly safeguarding 
China’s rights and interests in the South China Sea involves China’s core interests. This is 
not just the responsibility of the State Oceanic Administration. It is also the sacred mis-
sion of Hainan’s leaders in the Party and government. We must . . . scientifically develop 
fisheries resources in the South China Sea, rationally develop the oil/gas resources in the 
South China Sea, and energetically develop marine tourism. We must pursue development 
and exploitation of marine resources in order to manifest China’s concrete presence in the 
South China Sea and manifest China’s sovereignty over the islands of the South China Sea 
and their adjacent waters.268 
Empowering Chinese firms to explore and develop oil and gas resources is a key prong 
in China’s dispute strategy. In May 2012, on the occasion of a drilling operation con-
ducted by the newly built, deepwater, semisubmersible drilling rig CNOOC 981, an 
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SOA-run newspaper quoted CNOOC chairman Wang Yilin as saying that the rig, which 
he called “movable national territory,” would “make new contributions to the advance-
ment of China’s maritime power strategy and [efforts to] safeguard China’s maritime 
sovereignty.”269
This rationale no doubt motivated the rig’s first mission to disputed waters, in 2014. 
In May of that year, it was deployed south of Triton Island in the Paracels. Vietnam 
responded with vigor, sending coast guard and militia forces to harry its operations. 
Because of the expense of the rig and the scale and energy of Vietnam’s response, China 
was forced to employ dozens of cutters from several coast guard agencies to enforce an 
exclusion zone (警戒区) around it.270 The Chinese ships formed a protective perimeter, 
interposing themselves between the rig and the Vietnamese militia and coast guard ships 
seeking to approach it. They also engaged in aggressive maneuvering, including ram-
ming Vietnamese vessels, sinking at least one.271 Chinese forces purposely targeted their 
powerful water cannon at the smokestacks and radar and other electronic equipment of 
the Vietnamese vessels. The fleet succeeded in preventing the Vietnamese vessels from 
reaching the rig—but it was a very expensive, complex, and risky undertaking.272
Smaller in scale but equally intense confrontations had occurred in these waters as early 
as 2006. In June 2007, for instance, several CMS cutters accompanied a Sinopec vessel 
as it conducted seismic surveys south of the Paracels. According to Chinese accounts 
and video footage, Vietnamese paramilitary vessels sailed in front and obstructed the 
movements of the Sinopec ship and its escorts. Ultimately, the CMS forces chose to 
ram the smaller Vietnamese vessels, a desperate act meant to reverse their own passive 
position.273
Chinese naval and coast guard ships also ensure the security of Chinese fishermen op-
erating in disputed waters.274 The presence of Chinese fishermen helps manifest China’s 
maritime claims.275 As a commander at a PAP Border Defense Force unit based in a 
Hainan fishing village observed, “We should thank these fishermen, for if they weren’t 
fishing at Scarborough Shoal or the Spratlys, who could prove that these places are 
ours?”276 The Chinese government encourages their presence through subsidies (direct 
and in-kind) and direct payments, as well as salaries for seafarers serving in the mari-
time militia.277
Fishermen have been the cornerstone of Chinese dispute strategy in the South China 
Sea since at least 1985, when the PRC inaugurated a new policy known by the eight-
character slogan “in developing the Spratlys, fishing should be first” (开发南沙, 渔业先
行).278 In the 1980s and ’90s, as Chinese fishermen began operating in the Spratlys and 
other remote sections of the South China Sea, some faced harassment and arrest by for-
eign military and law-enforcement forces.279 FLE and later CCG vessels patrolled these 
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waters to protect them.280 These patrols permit Chinese fishermen to operate anywhere 
within the nine-dash line, pledging to protect all who follow this rule.281 For instance, in 
April 2012, cutter FLE 310 was ordered to come to the aid of Chinese fishermen facing 
harassment from Vietnamese “gunboats” while operating just off Vietnam’s coast but still 
within the nine-dash line.282
To improve the effectiveness of coast guard protection of Chinese civilian mariners, in 
2006 China began funding a program to install Beidou satellite navigation/communi-
cation devices on fishing vessels, beginning with those boats operating in the eastern 
sections of the South China Sea. With this equipment, Chinese fishermen could keep 
Chinese authorities apprised of developments at sea and call for help when they came 
under threat. Since Fisheries Law Enforcement had far too few oceangoing cutters for 
them to be present in sufficient numbers, in late 2009 these ships began convoying fish-
ing fleets to the more perilous sections of the South China Sea.283 Both of these efforts 
improved security for Chinese fishermen—but they also resulted in greater tensions with 
neighboring states.
Waters within the southernmost areas of the nine-dash line have been particularly 
prone to conflict over fishing rights. A large section of what Chinese fishermen call the 
“southwest fishing grounds” falls within Indonesia’s EEZ.284 When Indonesia attempts to 
enforce its coastal-state rights within these waters, incidents occur. For example, on May 
12, 2010, FLE 301 and 302 were ordered to rescue nine Chinese fishermen aboard a Chi-
nese trawler on which an Indonesian naval vessel had fired. After steaming two hours to 
the scene, the Chinese commander thwarted the attack by placing his cutters between 
the trawler and the Indonesian ship, which elected not to respond with armed force.285 
On June 23, 2010, a similar incident took place in these same waters in which FLE 303 
and 311 interposed themselves between three Chinese fishing vessels and the Indone-
sian naval forces attempting to board them.286 In March 2013, FLE 310 was involved in 
another serious incident in the southwest fishing grounds: an Indonesian coast guard 
vessel detained a number of Chinese fishermen. FLE 310 subsequently tracked down 
and confronted the Indonesian ship and, through a combination of threats and possibly 
communication jamming, compelled the Indonesian forces to release their Chinese 
captives.287
In the first half of 2016, the Indonesian government began a campaign to crack down 
on Chinese fishing in these same waters. Three separate incidents took place in four 
months. In each case, the China Coast Guard failed to prevent the detention of the 
Chinese crews. When Indonesia used force against Chinese fishermen, China did not 
respond in kind.288
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Chinese forces also escort Chinese fishermen operating in the East China Sea. Indeed, 
the September 2010 trawler collision near the Senkakus stemmed from a dispute over 
fishing rights, even if the original incident quickly evolved into a crisis over the land 
that generated those rights (i.e., the Senkaku Islands). The same is true of a more recent 
incident. In August 2016, twenty Chinese constabulary vessels—including a number 
of armed cutters from the former China Maritime Police—escorted a fleet of several 
hundred Chinese fishing trawlers to fishing grounds near the Senkaku Islands. Some 
fishing vessels and coast guard ships entered the Senkaku territorial sea. Japan did not 
attempt to remove the Chinese trawlers forcibly, opting instead to track and monitor 
their activities.289
This incident is noteworthy because it suggests how provocative actions in disputed 
areas may be driven by factors unrelated to the dispute itself. Chinese leaders may see 
maritime disputes as offering a means—or, in the words of a senior SOA analyst, “capi-
tal” (资产)—with which to pressure foreign leaders to amend or cease certain unrelated 
policies.290 One very well connected PLAN academic concluded that the August 2016 
Senkaku operation was designed to warn Japan of the possible consequences of insinuat-
ing itself further into the disputes in the South China Sea.291
If the use of force is out of the question, defending Chinese use of disputed waters is 
far more difficult than denying foreign use of the sea.292 When protecting an oil rig or 
surveying vessel, Chinese ships must position themselves between the assailants and 
their defenseless quarry, physically blocking foreign ships from approaching. The initia-
tive clearly lies with the attacker. Chinese leaders learned this bitter lesson during the 
Date Description
March 20 A Chinese trawler was boarded by an Indonesian  sheries law-enforcement vessel, its 
crew taken into custody, and the ship towed back to port in the Natuna Islands. On 
the way, a CCG cutter freed the trawler by ramming.a
May 27 An Indonesian frigate boarded a Chinese trawler, detained the crew, and towed the 
vessel back to port in the Natuna Islands. A CCG ship arrived on the scene but did not 
intervene. The frigate initially  red shots that damaged the trawler.b
June 17 An Indonesian warship  red shots at several Chinese trawlers, injuring one crewman. 
One  shing vessel was impounded; another was damaged. A CCG cutter arrived on 
the scene but did not intervene.c
Table 5. China-Indonesia Fishing Incidents in 2016
Notes:  
CCG = China Coast Guard.
a. Ankit Panda, “Indonesia Summons Chinese Ambassador after South China Sea Stand-Off near Natuna Islands,” The Diplomat, 
March 21, 2016, thediplomat.com/2016/03/indonesia-summons-chinese-ambassador-after-south-china-sea-stand-off-near 
-natuna-islands/; Jane Perlez and Yufan Huang, “Harrowing Trip for Chinese Trawler before Bump in Territorial Tensions,” New 
York Times, April 9, 2016, www.nytimes.com/2016/04/10/world/asia/harrowing-trip-for-chinese-trawler-before-bump-in 
-territorial-tensions.html?_r=0.
b. Chandni Vatvani, “Indonesia Seizes Yet Another Chinese Vessel,” Channel News Asia, May 30, 2016, www.channelnewsasia 
.com/news/asiapacific/indonesia-detains-yet/2827122.html?cid=cna_flip_070214. See also Niniek Karmini, “South China Sea:  
Indonesian Navy Fires Shots, Seizes Chinese Fishing Boat,” Sydney Morning Herald, May 31, 2016, www.smh.com.au/world/
south-china-sea-indonesian-navy-fires-shots-seizes-chinese-fishing-boat-20160531-gp7s45.html#ixzz4ADUjENdb.
c. Jake Spring, Ben Blanchard, and Kanupriya Kapoor, “Indonesian Navy Fires on Chinese Boat, Beijing Says One Injured,”  
Reuters, June 19, 2016, www.reuters.com/article/us-china-indonesia-ship-idUSKCN0Z50FG.
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2014 defense of CNOOC 981, when a few Vietnamese ships commanded by bold leaders 
pinned down large numbers of Chinese forces.
Given the great distances involved, protecting Chinese fishermen from foreign harass-
ment remains a very difficult mission, even given recent increases in Chinese coast 
guard presence and the widespread use of Beidou hardware. Despite Chinese efforts, in 
May 2014 the Philippines succeeded in arresting eleven Chinese fishermen for poaching 
in disputed waters off Half Moon Shoal in the Spratlys.293
Chinese coast guard forces serve on the front line in operations intended to ensure 
the security of Chinese civilians in disputed areas. However, where the risk exists of 
provoking an armed response, PLAN surface combatants likely linger nearby, on the 
second line. China deployed surface combatants to the scene during the 2014 defense of 
CNOOC 981.294 Gray hulls were no doubt present during earlier clashes in these same 
waters. Because the presence of gray hulls communicates a quiet signal, these operations 
seldom are publicized, and therefore little is known about how frequently they occur.295 
PLAN surface combatants probably seldom conduct frontline escort operations in dis-
puted areas.296
Dispute Type Operation Type Primary Function(s) Surface Fleet Action
Island sovereignty
Sovereignty patrol Manifest China’s claims; 
collect intelligence
Sail to waters surround-
ing a disputed feature
Blockade Enforce China’s claims Prevent foreign access to 
a disputed feature
Maritime rights
Tracking and monitoring Manifest China’s claims; 
collect intelligence
Follow foreign vessels 
operating “illegally” in 
Chinese-claimed waters; 
urge them to leave
Obstruction and eviction Enforce China’s claims Use nonlethal measures 
to force foreign vessels 
to cease “illegal” activi-
ties and depart Chinese-
claimed waters
Escort Enforce China’s claims Use nonlethal measures 
to prevent foreign ves-
sels from obstructing 
the “legal” operations 
of Chinese civilians in 
Chinese-claimed waters
Both Support and cover Discourage escalation; 
collect intelligence
Sail to and linger in 
disputed waters; signal 
a threat to use force to 
protect Chinese vessels; 
be prepared to act on 
that threat
Table 6. Major Operation Types in China’s Echelon Defense Strategy
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In China’s echelon defense approach, elements of Chinese sea power operate on two 
lines. Frontline operations involve efforts to manifest and enforce China’s maritime 
claims. They include operations that often, although not exclusively, are conducted by 
China’s maritime law-enforcement forces. There are five major types: sovereignty patrol, 
blockade, tracking and monitoring, obstruction and eviction, and escort. Second-line 
operations—the exclusive province of PLAN surface combatants—serve to discourage 
escalation by providing “support and cover” for frontline forces, whose assertive actions 
sometimes risk an armed response from other disputants. Together, these six operations 
constitute the “grammar” of the saltwater component of China’s dispute strategy.
Part 5: New Frontiers
When examined over time, China’s use of the echelon defense approach in its maritime 
disputes suggests a vigorous but politically sensitive campaign to turn the country’s 
claims into reality. By many measures, this campaign has been extremely successful: Chi-
nese ships are sailing to places they seldom, if ever, went before; the density of Chinese 
presence in disputed waters has increased dramatically; and China has converted this 
presence into increased influence and control. Most importantly, China has achieved 
these gains while avoiding the instability that would accompany a campaign that relied 
on more-overt forms of military aggression. Part 5 assesses China’s seaward expansion 
during the period 2006–16 and examines the key decisions that guided that expansion. It 
concludes with a discussion of the political and strategic costs China incurs by its use of 
the echelon defense approach as a tool in its dispute strategy.
Increased Presence
Over the last decade, the presence of Chinese coast guard and naval forces in disputed 
waters has grown at an astonishing rate. This is immediately evident when deployment 
patterns in 2006 are compared with those of 2016. In 2006, among China’s many mari-
time law-enforcement agencies, only the national-level units of China Marine Surveil-
lance and Fisheries Law Enforcement operated in disputed areas. Both, however, did so 
only rarely.
In the East China Sea, early 2006 saw China begin production at the Chunxiao gas 
fields.297 Although Chinese production facilities were located in undisputed waters 
west of the median line, Japan opposed them because they exploited reserves that may 
straddle the Japanese-claimed maritime boundary. Thus, CMS vessels patrolled these 
waters to ensure security.298 In the middle of 2006, as the result of a State Council deci-
sion (discussed below), the service began maintaining a more regular presence in the 
East China Sea; but this presence probably seldom extended east of the median line, and 
certainly never into waters adjacent to the Senkaku Islands. For its part, Fisheries Law 
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Enforcement was in the sixth year of systematic EEZ fisheries patrols (专属经济区渔政
巡航), which included missions within the large joint-fisheries zone in the East China 
Sea.299 However, there is no evidence that its cutters deployed to other disputed areas in 
the East China Sea, such as those in the vicinity of the Senkakus.300
In 2006, PLAN surface combatants probably rarely, if ever, patrolled contested parts of 
the East China Sea. In January 2005, two Sovremenny-class destroyers had sailed to the 
Chunxiao gas fields, purportedly the first time the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force 
had observed these advanced (by contemporary PLAN standards) vessels.301 In Sep-
tember 2005, five Chinese surface combatants patrolled another controversial gas field 
near the median line. However, there is no evidence that PLAN warships systematically 
ventured into disputed waters.302 Indeed, in 2006 the PLA Navy had not yet begun to 
conduct “far seas” training regularly, which meant the fleet had no opportunity to transit 
contested areas on the way into the western Pacific via the Miyako Strait. Surface com-
batant training beyond the first island chain would not occur until 2007.303
Aside from those to the Paracels—islands that are close to the mainland and entirely 
under PRC control—Chinese patrols to disputed waters in the South China Sea were 
extremely rare in 2006. CMS cutters maintained no regular presence near Scarborough 
Shoal or in the Spratlys—that would not happen until 2007 or 2008. For its part, Fisher-
ies Law Enforcement kept a single lonely cutter at Mischief Reef. Chinese fishing vessels 
operating elsewhere in the Spratlys were largely on their own, and sometimes paid a 
price for this absence of Chinese power.
The PLA Navy maintained tiny outposts at the handful of PRC-occupied features in 
the Spratlys. The available information does not indicate the extent of PLAN surface-
combatant presence in these areas, but it was probably quite low.304 In this period, PLAN 
warships were not yet sailing through the Strait of Malacca into the Indian Ocean—it 
would be another two years before China sent its first escort task force to the Gulf of 
Aden. Nor did the service send ship formations through the Bashi Channel for “far seas” 
training; again, that would not happen until 2007. To summarize: in 2006, the PLAN 
surface fleet rarely was seen in the South China Sea, aside from waters adjacent to the 
Paracels.
The next decade would witness an utter transformation in PLAN and coast guard opera-
tions in the East and South China Seas. In 2016, at two-week intervals Chinese con-
stabulary vessels sailed in formations of three to five ships to the Senkaku Islands, where 
they routinely entered the territorial sea. Most of these ships displaced at least three 
thousand tons; beginning in December 2015, many formations included at least one 
armed cutter. The vast majority of Chinese coast guard vessels operating in disputed wa-
ters in the East China Sea now answered to a single chain of command under a unified 
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maritime law-enforcement agency (the China Coast Guard), with all the improvements 
to coordination this implies. However, some ships operating east of the median line were 
owned by China’s provincial maritime law-enforcement agencies, which in 2006 were 
not authorized or equipped to participate in the “rights-protection” struggle.
Ten years later, PLAN surface combatants regularly were conducting “combat readiness 
patrols” to sensitive areas of the East China Sea.305 Many of their operations probably 
took them east of the median line, within striking distance of the Senkakus, so they could 
provide “support and cover” for the Chinese coast guard’s frequent patrols there. In 2016, 
PLAN ship formations regularly steamed through the Miyako Strait for “far seas” train-
ing, including, in December of that year, China’s first aircraft carrier, Liaoning.306
In the South China Sea, changes in the geographic scope and density of the Chinese 
surface-vessel presence were equally pronounced. CCG vessels—including some armed 
elements of the former China Maritime Police—now conducted regular patrols to all 
areas within the nine-dash line. Painted in CMS and FLE colors and pennant numbers, 
large cutters from provincial and even municipal coast guard agencies now contributed 
to the guarding of China’s maritime frontier.
In 2016, China kept a permanent constabulary presence at Scarborough Shoal and the 
Luconia Shoals. When operating in the eastern and southern sections of the South China 
Sea, Chinese coast guard forces could seek shelter and support at enormous new facili-
ties at Subi Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, and, above all, Mischief Reef, from which they easily 
could monitor the tiny contingent of Philippine marines at Second Thomas Shoal.307
The PLA Navy, too, by then was crisscrossing the South China Sea regularly. By the 
end of 2012, the PLA Navy had “normalized” (常态化) its presence in the Spratlys, 
and perhaps in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal.308 In 2016, Chinese warships were so 
numerous that they could afford to shadow USN ships during their patrols in the South 
China Sea.309 Massive new facilities at Chinese-occupied features in the Spratlys ensured 
excellent support for increased presence in these waters. Unlike in 2006, PLAN ships 
now regularly sailed through disputed waters in the South China Sea on their way to 
other places, either the Indian Ocean via the Malacca Strait to fight piracy in the Gulf of 
Aden, or the western Pacific via the Bashi Channel for “far seas” training.
Increased Enforcement
In large parts of the East and South China Seas, China’s maritime claims were almost 
purely theoretical in 2006. Since then, Chinese vessels have established a regular pres-
ence in all three million square kilometers of Chinese-claimed waters. China’s sea 
services also have led new efforts to use threats to enforce China’s maritime claims, 
sometimes in the face of foreign resistance. Whereas expanded Chinese presence can be 
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traced to 2006, the majority of known enforcement operations have occurred since 2010. 
What has China gained?
In the East China Sea, the Chinese coast guard, backed up by the PLA Navy, effectively 
underwrites Chinese civilian use of disputed areas. Chinese fishermen now operate with 
impunity in all Chinese-claimed waters in the East China Sea, including in the territorial 
sea of the Senkakus. Chinese gas production operations along the median line con-
tinue unabated, and even have expanded in recent years, although not yet into disputed 
areas.310 With its regular patrols to the Senkakus, the Chinese coast guard has turned 
the disputed islets into a no-man’s-land for either side.311 Japanese fishing rights in the 
disputed sections of the East China Sea still are respected, the joint fisheries agreement 
remaining in effect. However, were Japanese ships to resume surveying in Chinese-
claimed waters east of the median line, they likely would face harassment and obstruc-
tion from the Chinese coast guard. No such operations have been attempted since 2012.
China likewise has achieved major gains in the South China Sea over the last decade. 
Since mid-2012, Chinese sea power has enforced Chinese sovereignty claims to Scarbor-
ough Shoal. A similar attempt at Second Thomas Shoal in 2014 failed, but a more trac-
table administration under President Duterte, combined with the fragility of the current 
Philippine occupation, obviates the need for further action—the crumbling Sierra Madre 
soon could be the victim of time and tide.
Chinese fishermen now sail securely in large swaths of the South China Sea. With one 
exception in May 2014, Chinese fishermen operating in the Spratlys have not been 
harmed or arrested in years.312 Speaking in August 2014, the head of a Hainan-based 
fishermen’s association could report as follows: 
Over the past year, our biggest sentiment is that we feel much safer. Not only have 
maritime law-enforcement patrol vessels strengthened their patrols, the government has 
installed Beidou navigation systems on every fishing vessel at no cost. No matter where we 
go, the command center knows where we are. No matter what kind of problem arises at 
sea, as long as we inform the relevant department, a maritime law-enforcement ship will 
quickly arrive on the scene. As long as we request it, they send help.313 
China’s fisheries-escort operations have been less successful in the more remote sections 
of the South China Sea. Since late 2009, Chinese coast guard vessels have escorted Chi-
nese trawlers to waters within Indonesia’s EEZ.314 These missions succeeded in keeping 
Chinese fishermen safe, even though they resulted in incidents in 2010 and 2013. In the 
first half of 2016, Indonesia forcefully contested Chinese fishing activities in its EEZ, 
arresting Chinese fishermen in clear view of Chinese coast guard forces. However, since 
then the China Coast Guard may have tightened its escort operations: no such incidents 
occurred in the first half of 2017, despite Indonesia’s continued commitment to enforce 
its EEZ rights near Natuna.315 
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Since at least 2006, Vietnam has contested vigorously the deployment of oil/gas explora-
tion vessels to waters near the Paracels. China has the technical means to exploit seabed 
resources in disputed waters, but the CNOOC 981 incident shows the limits of China’s 
echelon defense approach when exercised against a committed foe. At the time of this 
writing, China has yet to begin oil/gas production in any contested areas of the South 
China Sea.
In recent years, China has cracked down on Vietnamese fishing activities in the Paracels, 
although the degree of enforcement tends to track the peaks and troughs of Sino-
Vietnamese relations.316 As long as they do not venture too close to Chinese-controlled 
features, foreign fishermen appear to be able to operate freely in most other disputed 
areas in the South China Sea. Still, the fear of encountering a Chinese coast guard cutter 
on the open ocean no doubt has had a dampening effect on some foreign fishing activi-
ties. China’s presence near the Luconia Shoals, for example, purportedly has scared away 
Malaysian fishermen, even though it appears that Chinese cutters are not enforcing fully 
Chinese sovereignty claims in these waters.317
Decision Points
Over the last decade, China has pursued its claims in the East and South China Seas 
with ever-increasing vigor. Relying on sea power coupled with other instruments of 
statecraft, China has expanded the frontiers of its control and influence within the first 
island chain. This expansion is understood best as an outcome of four major decisions, 
all made or endorsed by leaders at the most senior levels of government.
The first was to establish a constabulary presence in all Chinese-claimed waters. This 
can be traced to July 2006, when then-premier Wen Jiabao approved a new policy 
requiring CMS ships to conduct “regular” (定期) rights-protection patrols in Chinese-
claimed waters in the East China Sea.318 Chinese leaders subsequently decided to expand 
patrols to other areas. By the end of 2007, the service could claim a “comparatively high 
degree” of rights protection in all waters over which China claimed jurisdiction.319 By the 
end of 2008, China Marine Surveillance stated that it had regularized rights-protection 
patrols to all jurisdictional waters, “from the Yalu River to James Shoal.”320 This expan-
sion included the inaugural Senkaku patrol in December of that year.321
The regular rights-protection patrol system led to a geographic expansion in coast guard 
presence in Chinese-claimed waters. Over time, it also meant an increase in the concen-
tration of Chinese cutters in disputed waters. By 2012, China Marine Surveillance was 
maintaining at least nine ships constantly at sea, with at least six patrolling the waters of 
the South China Sea.322 Aggregate numbers of patrols increased tremendously over the 
2008–12 period. In 2008, CMS ships performed 113 regular rights-protection ship pa-
trols, sailing a total of 212,242 nm.323 But by 2012, China Marine Surveillance conducted 
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172 ship patrols covering 172,000 nm just in the South China Sea alone.324 In 2013, the 
last year such numbers were released, China Marine Surveillance as a whole conducted a 
total of 347 rights-protection patrols (543,652 nm).325
Chinese leaders placed special emphasis on patrolling “waters in which rights infringe-
ments take place most frequently.”326 According to one pseudonymous article published 
in an SOA-run newspaper, “the more controversial the waters and the more sensitive the 
place, the greater the focus of China Marine Surveillance patrols. This is the responsibil-
ity of China Marine Surveillance regular rights-protection patrols. In the future, we will 
continue to strengthen this [approach].”327
The newly created China Coast Guard has assumed the rights-protection duties of China 
Marine Surveillance and Fisheries Law Enforcement.328 It has carried on the regular 
patrols to the Senkakus that began in September 2012, generally maintaining the same 
tempo, albeit with more and larger vessels performing each mission.329 The China Coast 
Guard also has expanded maritime law-enforcement presence to new areas, especially 
in the South China Sea. In August 2013, for instance, CCG ships began “patrolling and 
monitoring” (巡航监控) the waters adjacent to the North and South Luconia Shoals, 
tiny features roughly ninety nautical miles from the coast of Malaysia and well within its 
EEZ.330 By early 2015, the character of these patrols had become something much more 
permanent: “keeping watch” (值守), the same term used to describe Chinese operations 
near Second Thomas Shoal.331 Indeed, automatic identification system (AIS) data indicate 
that CCG vessels are now stationed at the Luconia Shoals on a near-permanent basis.332
The second key decision, discussed in detail in part 2, was to increase vastly the size and 
capabilities of the Chinese fleet. This was actually a series of decisions made between 
2009 and 2012, with each new decision more ambitious in scope and scale. Chinese lead-
ers made these decisions as the rights-protection campaign unfolded and they discov-
ered what could be gained from adroit use of sea power.
The third key decision was to convert China’s new presence in disputed waters into a 
commitment actually to enforce some of China’s claims, where possible. This decision 
to begin vying with other states for control can be documented in the available sources. 
For example, the “Outline Plan for National Maritime Development (2006–2010),” 
a foundational policy document that the State Council approved in February 2008, 
contains numerous mentions of China’s need to safeguard maritime rights and interests. 
To do so, it recommended that China “strengthen its monitoring and management [监
管] of jurisdictional waters.”333 Sometime in the subsequent three years, however, this 
call for “monitoring and management” was replaced or supplemented by the language of 
control.
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In publicly available discourse, this new focus can be traced to 2011.334 Soon after he 
became SOA director in February 2011, Liu Cigui announced that his organization’s 
aims for 2011 included “strengthening control over jurisdictional waters” (强化管辖
海域的控制力).335 CMS leaders actively spread this new message.336 National planning 
documents also recognized the new goal. In March 2012, the State Council approved a 
document called “National Maritime Functional Zoning (2011–2020),” which outlined 
preferred zones of economic activity in China’s claimed jurisdictional waters. Among 
other things, this document charged local and national government entities with re-
sponsibility for “creating, according to the law, a system of comprehensive administrative 
control over all of China’s jurisdictional waters.”337
The language of control now dots official discourse. It appears in the text of the Twelfth 
Five-Year Plan for Maritime Development, released in April 2013. Like the “Outline Plan 
for National Maritime Development (2006–2010)” that it supersedes, this document 
repeatedly cites the need to safeguard maritime rights and interests. However, unlike the 
earlier document, it calls for China to “strengthen effective control over jurisdictional 
waters” and “raise the capacity to achieve administrative control” over disputed areas.338
The language of control now is invoked often in discussions about China’s strategy to be-
come a “maritime power” (海洋强国).339 At the January 2013 National Maritime Work 
Conference in Beijing, Xu Shaoshi, head of the Ministry of Land and Resources, stated 
that if it is to become a maritime power, “China’s struggle for maritime rights and inter-
ests must be strong and effective and it must do more to strengthen its ability to exert 
administrative control over the ocean.”340 Indeed, during an interview at the time of the 
Eighteenth Party Congress, then–SOA director Liu Cigui defined a “maritime power” as 
a state that “has formidable comprehensive power with respect to developing the ocean, 
exploiting the ocean, protecting the ocean, and controlling the ocean.”341
Such discourse finds parallels in the writings of officers in the PLA Navy, suggesting 
that this policy decision was endorsed by senior leaders within the party-state. In an 
August 2014 speech commemorating the 120th anniversary of the First Sino-Japanese 
War, then–PLAN commander Wu Shengli wrote that in the face of growing discord in 
the near seas, China must “continuously strengthen administrative control over claimed 
waters.”342 In a very important March 19, 2014, article in the navy’s official newspaper, 
Rear Adm. Zhang Zhaoyin, then deputy commander of the South Sea Fleet, described 
China’s approach to handling its maritime disputes in his area of responsibility. Admiral 
Zhang cited “administrative control” as the goal and outlined how his service would 
help take the initiative to achieve it. Zhang called for closer cooperation with maritime 
law enforcement. China would have to build up its maritime law-enforcement forces, 
which in his view were still too weak. As it did so, China must “continually augment the 
strength of its administrative control and rights protection within the South China Sea, 
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gradually achieving effective administrative control over Chinese jurisdictional waters in 
the South China Sea.”343
The fourth decision was to be less compromising. This new attitude is implied by the 
three decisions discussed above. However, in 2012 there seems to have been a more 
fundamental shift, one that Xi Jinping endorsed personally. This new reluctance to 
compromise is captured in an oft-repeated Xi Jinping quote, which succinctly expresses 
the Xi Jinping doctrine for handling China’s maritime disputes: “We love peace, and will 
continue to take the path of peaceful development, but we absolutely cannot give up our 
legitimate rights and interests, much less sacrifice core national interests.”344
This shift may have been prompted by a sincere (albeit delusional) belief that China’s 
earlier efforts at conciliation had gone unreciprocated. As one Chinese analyst wrote 
about this sense of disappointment, “It was regrettable that our good-hearted hopes were 
frequently ignored, that our friendly attitude was seen as a loophole to be exploited.”345 
Perhaps reflecting the mainstream view, one researcher at the PAP Academy claimed 
that Deng Xiaoping’s policy of “keeping a low profile” (韬光养晦) actually “caused 
China’s maritime territory and maritime rights and interests to be repeatedly gobbled 
up by neighboring states.”346 America’s growing involvement in East Asian affairs as part 
of the “rebalance to Asia”—inevitably interpreted to be an enhanced form of American 
“containment” of China—reinforced the PRC’s belief that more action was called for.
Chinese leaders and analysts see this decision to be less compromising as a fundamental 
shift in how the regime balances the two contradictory objectives of rights and stability. 
As the director of the SOA’s Department of International Cooperation, Zhang Haiwen, put 
it in a September 2014 speech, China’s current maritime dispute policy “is not like in the 
past when China simply said that the big aim was a stable periphery, and that everything 
else must yield to stability. In my view, for 10–20 years stability maintenance held the 
dominant position. But in recent years, China has balanced this out, meaning that stability 
maintenance and rights protection are now in a dynamic equilibrium [动态平衡].”347
The Costs of Coercion
If seen as a military campaign to control space, China’s echelon defense strategy has 
achieved much in the last ten years. The PRC has undermined foreign control over 
disputed land features and strengthened its influence over human activity in disputed 
waters. However, these gains have not come without costs.
While China has avoided armed conflict with other disputants, the success of its strategy 
nevertheless has antagonized and alienated its neighbors.348 In response, they have 
sought better relations with China’s rivals. Since 2010, Japan has bolstered its relation-
ship with the United States, in large part as a response to assertive Chinese behavior 
in the East China Sea. In April 2014, the United States and the Philippines signed the 
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Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, allowing the U.S. military wider access to 
Philippine military installations.349 Both the Philippines and Vietnam have turned to 
Japan to provide material support in the form of coast guard cutters.350 In the end, the 
very success of China’s echelon defense approach has spurred a foreign response that 
ultimately could lead to a diminution of China’s sense of security.
Moreover, Chinese actions have spawned fear and suspicion in the United States, the 
only state powerful enough to tip the scales against China. While America is not a dis-
putant, Chinese actions raise grave concerns about the future of American access to the 
waters of East Asia. Chinese naval and coast guard forces currently represent a modest 
but very real threat to American freedom of navigation. To date, Chinese efforts to im-
pede U.S. naval operations in these waters largely have centered on defenseless special-
mission ships such as USNS Impeccable, Effective, Victorious, Loyal, and Bowditch, which 
routinely operate within the first island chain.351 Harassment directed against these ships 
largely has taken place in undisputed waters, and has been fairly rare.352 However, China 
never has renounced its opposition to the presence of U.S. naval vessels in Chinese-
claimed jurisdictional waters, and it continues to differentiate between commercial 
freedom of navigation (legitimate, welcome) and the freedoms of foreign naval vessels 
(illegitimate, unwanted). American strategists therefore cannot discount the threat of 
future incidents.
As China consolidates control over disputed areas, the waters within which American 
ships might face obstruction and other threats will continue to expand. Moreover, now 
that China has built major military bases in the Spratlys, special-mission ships—and the 
forces that would come to their rescue in any incident—must worry about the presence 
of significant Chinese combat power at their rear.353 In sum, although largely directed 
against other states, PRC actions have primed the United States to play a more active role 
balancing against China’s seaward expansion and to strengthen its ability to threaten and 
destroy Chinese forces at sea—outcomes that bring into question the ultimate worth of 
China’s echelon defense approach.
Since 2006, China has enlarged dramatically the geographic frontiers of its influence 
and control in the near seas of East Asia. It has done this in large part through adroit use 
of unarmed or lightly armed constabulary vessels backed up by Chinese navy surface 
combatants, in what Chinese strategists call an echelon defense approach. Application 
of this approach has expanded and intensified over time, the result of at least four major 
decisions by senior Chinese leaders. These include decisions to establish a regular con-
stabulary presence in all Chinese-claimed waters, to invest heavily in new surface vessels 
for both the coast guard and the navy, to convert passive presence in disputed areas into 
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a national effort to vie for control over space, and to be less compromising toward other 
disputants. When viewed as a campaign to assert Chinese claims, the echelon defense 
approach has been quite effective. However, its successes have come at the cost of dam-
aged relations with its neighbors and the United States. Already the fears and suspicions 
that PRC actions at sea have spawned are driving policies certain to erode the founda-
tions of PRC prosperity and security that have stood for close to forty years.
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353.  As Peter Dutton points out, the new Spratly 
bases have turned the South China Sea into a 
strategic strait, in which foreign ships can be 
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